rence of this, I prevailed upon the Sanitary Commission to establish refreshment stations at Kingston, Resaca, and Dalton. They promptly placed their agents in the above-named places, and after this there was no more want of food, coffee, or water.
The wounded transported in box-cars cannot be properly cared for in consequence of the impossibility of passing from car to car, save when at rest. The dressing of the wounded could be done only on the switches, when the cars were waiting for the down trains. The trains from the front generally passed up at night, and lanterns were not furnished them. Few, then, of the wounded were properly dressed from the time of leaving the front until they arrived at Chattanooga, and the condition of many arriving there was lamentable. I know that many complaints have been made of the manner in which the sick were transported, and of the condition in which some of them arrived at Chattanooga. It was, however, impossible to do better than was done. The conveniences were few, the wounded many, and the stay-at-the-rear-fault-finding patriots in excess. Everything at our command was made use of to mitigate the sufferings of our troops, and it was only when the medical department had no control that the wounded were subjected to unnecessary suffering.
The wounded from the actions between Marietta and the Chattahoochee River were sent to the field hospital at Marietta, and thence to the rear. Those from the actions in the front of Atlanta to the same hospital at Vining's Station, or were treated in the division hospitals. The wounded from Jonesborough were brought from that place Atlanta in ambulances, and were, and are at present, treated in the division hospitals with a success seldom surpassed in the history of military surgery.
The wounds met with in the campaign were caused by rifled and smooth-bored artillery, rifled musketry, throwing elongated projectiles, the saber, and bayonet. The wounds were caused at all distances, from the extreme range of artillery and musketry to hand-to-hand conflict. They were, too, of every character producible by the projectiles now used, from the lightest scratch to perfect dismemberment.
I regret to state that the reports of the wounded prior to the 27th of June are [not] very reliable, owing to a want of care on the part of some of the medical officers in charge of division hospitals. This remark is particularly applicable to the reports of the Third Division, of the Twentieth Army Corps, and to the Second Division, of the Fourteenth Corps. The medical officers are not to be blamed for this, as they were informed by Surgeon Otterson, medical director of the corps, at the opening of the campaign, that no reports would be required, as no transportation for desks was furnished them. Every endeavor has been made to have them as nearly correct as possible, but they are still more or less unreliable. The number of wounded reported by tabular statement having been received into the brigade and division hospitals at the front during the campaign is 14,450. The number reported by consolidating the weekly reports is 15,559. This discrepancy may be accounted for by many slight wounds not having been reported in the tabular statement. The number reported as having died from wounds in the hospitals at the front is, by tabular statement, 904, by consolidated reports, 1,067. The number of amputations performed is reported as 1,286; the number exsections, 302; the number of other operations, 790. Chloroform is reported as having been used in 1,255 cases; but this