tween the timbers to permit the infantry fire, if carefully delivered, to pass freely through, but no sufficient to permit a person to pass through, and having a height of twelve to fourteen feet. The ground in front of these palisades or stockades was always completely swept by the fire from the adjacent batteries, which enabled a very small force to hold them. To this line we opposed another, extending from a point one and a half miles south of the Augusta railroad around by the north to a point one and a half miles southwest from the three-mile post on the Atlanta and Chattanooga Railroad. About noon, while engaged in extending this line to the left and front, the enemy, making a detour to the south and eastward, passed around our left flank and, completely enveloping it, attacked it both in flank and rear. Fortunately the Sixteenth Corps was en route to meet just such an attack, and was in position to form looking to our left rear, its right joining the Seventeenth Army Corps. The fighting here was of the most desperate character. Meanwhile the enemy pushed one corps from their works right down the Augusta railroad upon our line, where they gained a temporary success, but were finally driven back at all points. Our troops now were put under the cover of the ordinary rifle trenches, with works of a slightly heavier character for the artillery.
Close reconnaissance were made of the enemy's whole line in our front, and it was decided that no attempt at assault should be made upon that part of the enemy's line which we could see. On the 23rd of July I talked with the major-general commanding, and from him I learned that no assault would be made at present, neither did he desire anything like regular siege operations, but instructed me to see that the lines occupied by our troops were of such a character that they could be held against a sortie, and to put them forward at all points where it could be conveniently done, at the same time informing me that he would attempt to reach the enemy's line of railroad communication, at or near East Point, the junction of the roads from West Point and Macon to Atlanta. It is about six miles southwest from Atlanta. This movement he hoped would either result in a general engagement, with the chances greatly in our favor, or in the evacuation of Atlanta. He directed me to perorally select a line at the Augusta railroad where our left flank could rest and command that road, while the Army of the Tennessee was withdrawn to make the movement indicated. On the morning of the 24th of July, accompanied by Capts. C. B. Reese and J. W. Barlow and Lieutenants Twining and Ernst, of the Corps of Engineers, I passed over the ground, selected the line, and gave the necessary directions for its construction. General Sherman having determined to send cavalry force around each flank of the enemy to operate upon his communication, I was directed to see in person to the construction of a pontoon bridge at Turner's Ferry. This was done by ordering the train belonging to the Army of the Tennessee from where it was then laid, at the railroad crossing over the Chattahoochee, via the old Peach Tree road to Turner's Ferry. After proceeding as far as Proctor's Creek, we found that the enemy occupied Turner's Ferry. It was then too late to do anything toward fighting for possession of the ferry, and I died not have a single armed man with me, even if there had been time. Upon a report of the facts to General Sherman, he ordered the cavalry division of General McCook to clear the ground at daybreak next