reliable, I had reason to think the enemy would attempt to cross the river at a ford about one mile above the Monocacy bridge. I therefore posted one of my companies at that point with orders to hold it at all hazards. There was no alarm on my lines during the night.
At daylight on the 9th I caused my skirmish line to be deployed ont he crest of the ridge on the Frederick side of the river, and made every preparation in my power to hold the position as ordered. The enemy made his appearance at 6 a.m. and threw out his skirmishers, who soon became engaged with my men. About 10 a. m. I discovered from a point overlooking the field the rebel cavalry making disposition to turn my right and cross the river at the ford before alluded to. I sent company E, Captain Jenkins, to re-enforce Captain McGinnis, who held the ford; also a company of mounted infantry, commanded by Captain Leib, U. S. Army. The enemy were handsomely repulsed in the attempt to cross the river at the upper ford, and withdrew his forces, leaving only a light skirmish line. I now discovered that an effort was being made to attack my left in force. I sent immediately for re-enforcements. Companies B, I, and G, One hundred and forty-fourth Ohio National Guard, were sent to my relief. I had sent five men of the mounted infantry force to my left, to watch the movements of the enemy and report immediately should he make any demonstration in that quarter. These men I heard nothing of until some hours afterward, having been fired on and retreated, leaving me without information as to the effort that was making against my left. As it was extremely uncertain at what particular point he would make the demonstration, I was compelled to keep three companies in reserve at the bridge in order to be prepared to meet him at any point he might choose. About 11.30 a. m. the attack came; a heavy force of infantry had been deployed on the extension of my line of skirmishers and marched by the flank to within range of my extreme left. All this had been done under cover of the ground, which at that point was very favorable to the enemy for that purpose. The superiority of his numbers enabled him to push back my left and take position so as to enfilade my line. In order to dislodge the enemy from this position and restore my line it was necessary to have recourse to the bayonet, which in this instance proved very effective. I ordered Company B, One hundred and forty-ninth, to charge the enemy's position, which it did, but was repulsed. I then took Companies B, I, and G, One hundred and forty-fourth, re-enforced, drove the rebels from their position and re-established my lines. During this charge my loss was quite severe, owing to the fact that the enemy was posted behind the fence, while my men were compelled to charge across an open field, up the hill in fair view, and within short range of his guns. We took 2 prisoners, and the enemy left 2 dead on the field. I now extended my line so as to command this position, which I held throughout the day, until my force was withdrawn. Between 4 and 5 p. m. I received an order from Major-General Wallace to hold the bridge over the Monocacy at that point to the last extremity, and when I was pressed to hard that nothing more could be done, to command my men to disperse and to take care of themselves. At this time the firing had ceased at the Monocacy Junction, and being satisfied that the enemy would make a desperate effort to obtain possession of the bridge, and thus cut off my retreat as well a gain the rear of the army, I made such disposition of the forces