HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, June 3, 1864-8 a.m.
Since my last dispatch I have received reports, both from right [and left]. As stated, I am a good deal in advance of both the Second and Eighteenth Corps, and the reason why General Smith thinks that I am not moving with him is that he is behind me. This is further proved by the fact that the enemy is enfilading my lines from my left, and the enemy's artillery is firing down my lines and on both sides of my present headquarters. My troops will advance throughout my line with the troops on my right and left, and independently of either, if possible.
H. G. WRIGHT,
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS, June 3, 1864-10.30 a. m.
I just learn from General Smith, commanding Eighteenth Corps, that he has but four regiments with which who to support an assault on my right. I deem this altogether an insufficient protection, in view of the position of the enemy's lines in relation to my own, and have sent to him for his opinion, he knowing his front better than myself. I have also requested him to state whether he can or not maintain, in connection with me, the advanced position we now hold. His answer will be sent to you at once. If he can't advance, I think any forward movement on my part would be unsuccessful, as I am directly in front, from 100 to 200 yards distance, of the strongly entrenched lines of the enemy. I have ordered that my advanced position be held till further orders, and will intrench it, waiting further instructions.
H. G. WRIGHT,
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS, June 3, 1864-6.45 p. m.
In reply to circular of 6.30 p .m. I have the honor to report that my first line is at distances from the enemy's works varying from 50 to 150 or 200 yards, and that a considerable part of my front is already partially entrenched. The remainder cannot be undertaken till after dark, as it is quite impossible to work under the enemy's fire. I shall endeavor to work up still nearer to the enemy to-night on certain parts of the line, with what success remains to be determined. Where the rebel works can be distinctly seen they are very strong, and are presumed to be so on the parts concealed. It is so difficult getting along our front line before it is fully entrenched that anything like a correct reconnaissance cannot be made, and I cannot, therefore, say with any certainty what it is practicable to do to-morrow. In my judgment the line should be carefully examined
35 R R-VOL XXXVI, PT III