took you to accomplish the 4? You nowhere in your report say, nor is it true, that you or your brigade commander of the force under your immediate command, with which you were to make the real attack, saw any 20 rebel soldiers in any one body during this day. You saw no line of battle, nor did your soldiers approach near enough the enemy's works to ascertain whether or not there was an abatis in front of them, and the strength of them was only demonstrated upon another part of the line, where they were ridden over by General Kautz with his cavalry.
You further report to me that General Hinks "drove the enemy into their entrenchments," and that your ordered him to hold his position and keep the enemy within his entrenchments, and that he replied that he thought he could do it. His exact reply was that he "could do so until doomsday," if that was all you desired. You further say, in your report, that "on Colonel Hawley's front the enemy were never entirely within their works, but fourth outside." As you never saw anything but a skirmish line fighting, why do you say that "Colonel Hawley drove in the pickets," if they always fought outside? You further say, "As soon as the nature of the works in our front was ascertained, I was convinced that an assault upon them would, in all probability, fail." It is respectfully submitted that that was none of your business. You were ordered to make that assault, and upon the commanding general was the responsibility. You further say in your report that "I ordered the two positions to be maintained, expecting every moment to hear from General Kautz, who was expected to reach the enemy's works at 9 o'clock." Is there anything in your report or in the facts which is descriptive of a "quick, decisive push," or anything which seems like that, or any reported attempt to obey my order? You further say that "at about 1 o'clock, in order to get General Hinks and Colonel Hawley together, I directed them to withdraw to the junction of the road in front of Baylor's, where I waited until after 3 o'clock to hear from General Kautz," or, in other words, General Hinks and Colonel Hawley "being a mile apart in front of the enemy's works," as you say in a former part of your report, you withdrew them 2 miles from those works in order to get them together. It might be supposed that a junction of a mile might have been made without a withdrawal of 2 miles from in front of the entrenchments, which you admit that, if you could not take, you were to remain and hold the enemy in them until you heard from General Kautz. It is suggested that advancing toward him 2 miles would have been a much more certain way to have heard from him.
Again you say, "Receiving no information from that quarter, I concluded that he had taken his command on a raid, as directed or authorized by you." This last sentence is an entire misstatement of the fact, so gross that one would suppose it must have been known to you. General Kautz was not authorized or directed by me to go on any raid until after Petersburg was taken, the bridges and public buildings and public property destroyed, which would put the lines of the Appomattox between him and the enemy. Nothing could be better understood; nothing more distinct. If you supposed he had taken Petersburg and then had gone on the raid authorized, why did you not go in? If you supposed he had not taken Petersburg, why did you not go to his support? It seems to me that an infantry support of 3,500 men deserting 1,400 cavalry and leaving them to their fate in immediate contact with the forces