be increased so that damages can be speedily repaired. The reasons are that the work is far to the front, the transportation thither is difficult and liable to be interrupted. With one extra carriage for every two guns of the same description, and an extra one for every gun of singular kind, a few extra gun-gins and hand-spikes, a defense against siege when the work is finished might be prolonged very long indeed, protected as it is by the rapid tide-way of Beach Inlet. The work ought to be supplied with mortars; one or two 10-inch sea-coast, and a number of 10-inch siege and 8-inch siege, would do for the purposes required. The danger of the point would then be principally from the contingency of the enemy's effecting a landing to the westward and holding position under the guns of the navy while the attack was made upon the isolated position. This is remote so long as we are full handed, but threatens as our force is reduced. It seems to me that it will be, to a great extent, guarded against by furnishing up and protecting the two-gun batteries with chevaux-de-frise, and closing the gorges with palisades, and still further by inclosing Battery Beauregard and finishing up the work thence to Rutledge; besides, the sea-face of Fort Moultrie should be protected by obstructions, as it has no flank defense. Strength would be still further attained by constructing a battery for light guns, defiladed and protected from Morris Island and the sea, at the west end of Sullivan's Island to interfere with any boat raid in that direction.
A still further element of strength, and in my opinion a strong one, would be to have an inclosed work about midway between Batteries Marshall and Beauregard. At about the point desirable there is a circle of sand hills which would facilitate such construction. Its northern, eastern, and western fronts would not require to be so heavy as that looking to sea; it could be armed with guns taken from the two-gun batteries adjacent, which could then be used for light guns, would render any attack between Beauregard and Marshall abortive, and would serve as a tete-de-pont to our ferry arrangements between Kinloch's and Sullivan's Island. There are now on Sullivan's Island in position seventy-one guns and mortars, heavy and light, of all calibers, requiring for their proper and efficient services in continued operations, local battery guards included, 1,065 artillerists. With a few additions of heavy guns and mortars requiring, say, 135 men, a round number of 1,200 effective artillerists would suffice for manning all the necessary guns. Were the works finished and provided as I have hastily suggested, and supported by 800 good infantry, two or more light batteries as needed, and a small detachment of patrols and couriers, I believe the island, under proper commanders and proper attention to the commissariat, and other staff departments, would be secure against anything like a surprise, and probably against a siege and naval attack combined, although such attack were assisted by all the batteries the enemy could crowd on Morris Island. One thousand men at Mount Pleasant, and on the shore of the main toward Bull's Bay, including the light artillery necessary for Sullivan's Island, and the cavalry for the outposts, would secure the communication, and guard against surprise. If Bull's Bay were made the base of an attack it would have, of course, to be opposed according to its nature. Unless the works on Sullivan's Island are pushed, and provided so as to effect the purposes indicated, instead of attaining almost positive security, with 3,000 men in this command, twice that number will hardly suffice to put