and concentration of troops, even under the most favorable auspices, is difficult. By placing all the resources of the army at their command, I hoped to bring these troops again into the field in time to perform their part in the defense of the State. If dependent alone upon the action of the State brigadier-generals, with no mode provided or suggested as yet for their support, I can only apprehend delays, which may be dangerous to the safety of the country.
The movements of the enemy in Louisiana and Arkansas indicate an active campaign in the Trans-Mississippi Department. General [Green's] entire division is already on the march for Alexandria, and I have received orders to mobilize all my disposable forces and hold them in readiness for a move eastward. I have been satisfied for weeks that but a small portion of the enemy have left our coast; that he is fortifying and rendering his position secure in anticipation of a raid into the interior. To interpose a sufficient force in his front, and to garrison important points so that disciplined troops may be withdrawn, I must have more troops. It will be absolutely necessary to march the State troops by companies immediately to such points as may be endangered, and organize them into regiments on their arrival, and I sincerely trust Your Excellency will therefore leave the troops where your proclamation of 21st January places them, subject to my orders, so that in any movements I desire my action may be untrammeled by conflicting orders from your brigadier-generals.
I would again respectfully represent to Your Excellency the importance of organizing the companies sufficiently strong to secure the efficiency of the companies after the departure of the furloughed men. If the minimum be declared 100 men, it would be better, in my opinion, to furlough the first class at the battalion camps, which would leave the companies sufficiently strong and permit the furloughed men to remain home at a time when their services are most important to the agricultural interests of the country. I would also again present the superiority of infantry over cavalry. When companies bring into the field a good, serviceable gun, they may be mustered as cavalry, but without their horses, and with the distinct understanding that all men whose guns are reported unserviceable on inspection will be transferred to infantry. I am satisfied that the country cannot sustain more cavalry, and I do not wish to burden the people unnecessarily.
I have, &c.,
J. B. MAGRUDER,
[Inclosure No. 3.] EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Austin, March 16, 1864.
Major General J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER:
SIR: Your letter by favor of Captain F. Noessel was received. If I understand General Orders, No. 13, I believe, which embraces an agreement had with you when at Houston and which has been published to the country, the action of General McAdoo is not in violation of it. The order is not before me, but my recollection is that the State troops were to report to the brigadier-generals upon their return home, and then in process of reorganization they have to be
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