made in the spring. If I am right in that impression, and the President's intentions are unchanged, I respectfully suggest that much preparation is necessary-large additions to the number of troops, a great quantity of field transportation, subsistence stores and forage, a bridge equipage,a nd fresh artillery horses. Few of those we have are fit for a three days' march, as they have not recovered from the effects of the last campaign. To make our artillery efficient, at least 1,000 fresh \horses are required, even should we stand on the defensive. Let me suggest that the necessary measures be taken without delay.
The artillery also wants organization,a nd especially a competent commander. I therefore respectfully urge that such a one be sent me. I have applied for Colonel Alexander, but General Lee objects that he is too valuable in his present position to be taken from it. His value to the country would be more than doubled, I think, by the promotion and assignment I recommend.
Should the movement in question be made, Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command would necessarily take part in it. Other troops might be drawn from General Beauregard's and Lieutenant-General Polk's departments. The infantry of the latter is so small a force that what would remain after the formation of a proper garrison for Mobile would be useless in Mississippi. But of these matters you are much better informed than I.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. JOHNSTON.
CONFIDENTIAL.] HEADQUARTERS, Greensville, February 27, 1864.
General R. E. LEE,
Commanding Army of Northern Virginia:
GENERAL: Your letter of the 17th is received. The general system of the enemy's plans is evident enough-that is, to concentrate his force upon some way on some other point. It seems to me that we would concentrate and recover Tennessee and Kentucky. This we can do if we will go to work with the determination that it shall be done. The mode that I propose is hte easiest and most rapid one-that is, to mount my command here and throw it across the mountains upon hte enemy's line of communication. The difficulty is to get the mount. About a third of my men can get their own horses. I can spare 2,000 mules by reducing my transportation to what all armies should be. I believe that I could collect 1,500 animals form the Department of West Virginia by a similar reduction. You could spare 2,000 mules by reducing my transportation to what all armies should be. I believe that I could collect 1,500 animals from the Department of West Virginia by a similar reduction. You could spare 2,000 or 3,000, if you remain on the railroad lines; General Beauregard could spare a thousand; I suppose a thousand could be spared from Alabama and Mississippi.
Saddles and bridles could be got by impressment. Corn, horseshoes, and mule shoes should be sent here in abundance to give two or three days to start upon. To do this, all railroads should be impressed, and passenger-cars stopped for forty days. I have just returned from Knoxville or its vicinity. I went there under the hope that I could be re-enforced sufficiently and make a capture of the Yankee army there. My own force was strong enough, but for the