will then be no use for our force here. But we could most effectually protect this country by the occupancy of West Tennessee, where there is an abundance of forage and subsistence, leaving a small force to watch the line from Memphis, and also another small force to watch the country from Corinth to Bear Creek; the balance could advance into, occupy, and hold West Tennessee, and, it may be, West Kentucky. As I have special duties to perform in West Tennessee, and my detention here was only to be temporary-for a particular purpose, which will have been accomplished, so far as my command is concerned, by the evacuation of this railroad-I ask for the privilege to move into West Tennessee, if compatible with your views of the public interest.
R. V. RICHARDSON,
Colonel, Commanding Northeast Mississippi.
P. S.-My men were brought from home in the hot summer, without clothing or bedding, none expecting to remain here longer than arms, &c., could be drawn. They were thinly clad, and are now both naked and barefooted, without bedding. I have made requisitions for clothing and cooking utensils and other necessary equipments, but your quartermasters either have not gotten these things or are indifferent to our wants. I dislike to complain, but the indifference of the general staff to the wants of men in the field is growing to be an immense public sin.
R. V. RICHARDSON,
HEADQUARTERS, Sweet Water, November 10, 1863.
GENERAL: Please have all your horses shod as rapidly as possible. I would like you to move your headquarters near the Sweet Water to-morrow or next day, and have your cavalry as near us as they can be, to get forage, &c. I would like to march on the 13th, if I can get transportation, &c., in time.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Missionary Ridge, November 11, 1863.
GENERAL: Your communication of the 9th instant, in relation to the artillery of General Wheeler and asking for re-enforcements, has been received, and in reply thereto I am instructed by the general commanding to say that he deems it unnecessary to add more artillery to the cavalry, it tending too much to impede active operations.