brigades of the Fourth Corps, ordered to co-operate with him; the whole under command of Major-General Hooker. Howard's corps was to be held in readiness to act either with my troops at Chattanooga or with General Sherman's, and was ordered to take up a position on Friday night on the north side of the Tennessee near the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as might become necessary. General Smith commenced at once to collect his pontoons and materials for bridges in the North Chickamauga Creek, preparatory to the crossing of Sherman's troops, proper precautions being taken that the enemy should not discover the movements. General Sherman then returned to Bridgeport to direct the movements of his troops. Colonel Long (Fourth Ohio Cavalry), commanding Second Brigade, Second Division Cavalry, was ordered on the 16th to report at Chattanooga on Saturday, the 21st by noon; the intention being for him to follow up the left flank of Sherman's troops, and if not required by General Sherman, he was to cross the Chickamauga, make a raid upon the enemy's communications, and do as much damage as possible. Owing to a heavy rain-storm, commencing on Friday (20th), and lasting all of the 21st, General Sherman was not enabled to get his troops in position in time to commence operations on Saturday morning, as he expected.
Learning that the enemy had discovered Sherman's movements across Lookout Valley, it was thought best that General Howard should cross over into Chattanooga, thus attracting the attention of the enemy, with the intention of leading him to suppose that those troops he had observed moving were re-enforcing Chattanooga, and thereby concealing the real movements of Sherman. Accordingly, Howard's corps was crossed into Chattanooga on Sunday, and took up a position in full view of the enemy. In consequence of the bad condition of the roads General Sherman's troops were occupied all of Sunday in getting into position. In the meantime, the river having risen, both pontoon bridges were broken by rafts sent down the river by the enemy, cutting off Osterhaus' division from the balance of Sherman's troops. It was thought this would delay us another day, but during the night of the 22d, two deserters reported Bragg had fallen back, and that there was only a strong picket line in our front. Early on the morning of the 23d, I received a note from Major-General Grant, directing me to ascertain by a demonstration the truth of falsity of this report.
Orders were accordingly given to General Granger, commanding the Fourth Corps, to form his troops and to advance directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the strength of the enemy. General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, was directed to support General Granger's right, with Baird's division refused and en echelon. Johnston's division, Fourteenth Corps, to be held in readiness, under arms, in the intrenchments, to re-enforce at any point. Howard's corps was formed en masse behind the center of Granger's corps. The two divisions of Granger's corps (Sheridan's and Wood's) were formed in front of Fort Wood; Sheridan ont the right, Wood on the left, with his left extending nearly to Citico Creek. The formation being completed about 2 p.m. the troops were advanced steadily and with rapidity directly to the front, driving before them first the rebel pickets, then their reserves, and falling upon their grand guards stationed in their first line of rifle-pits, captured something over 200 men, and secured themselves in their new positions before the enemy had sufficiently recovered from his surprise to attempt to attempt to send re-