one division at Wartrace, and, if possible, one at Decherd-till the raid blows over. Our cavalry is after them, and aided by re-enforcements will, I think, limit the mischief. See well to the safety of our depots at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and if you can spare a division to Therman and supply it, do so. We don't know the extent of our loss in wagons yesterday. Our weak points are the railroad and our left flank, which, I trust, Burnside will soon close.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
STEVENSON, ALA., October 3, 1863-4,45 p.m.
Brigadier-General GARFIELD, Chattanooga:
Dispatch of 1.30 just received. I had not been advised of an intended raid. The dispositions desired will be made as speedily as it can be done with the commands scattered and en route. It will be impossible to put a division at Therman and supply it until we get transportation. Have none yet. Please send us maps.
WASHINGTON, October 3, 1863-4 p.m.
General Rosecrans reports that the enemy's cavalry have crossed the river below Kingston for a raid upon his communications. I can only repeat what I have so often urged, the importance of your connecting with General Rosecrans' army on the north side of the river, so as to command the crossings.
H. W. HALLECK,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 3, 1863. [Received 4th.]
Plans received.* The first plan is the only one now practicable. No time should be lost in its execution. We have a light brigade of infantry near Blythe's Ferry, and a light cavalry patrol from that down. No time should by lost by you in covering our left in force. Hasten.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, [October 3, 1863.]
Your dispatch of 2nd, 7 p.m., received. Surprised that you don't come to our assistance. We want you on our left flank with all you
*See Part III, p.954.