at that place composed wholly of pontoons. The remaining boats will be held in readiness for shipment up the river. Make provision for saving the lumber of the trestle bridge there in case the river rises. Put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparation for crossing your command at that point.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 1, 1863-10.45 a.m.
Yours of yesterday is received.* The purport of all your instructions have been that you should hold some point near the upper end of the valley, and, with all the remainder of your available force, march to the assistance of General Rosecrans. The routes of march and all details were left to your own judgment. Since the battle of Chickamauga and the retreat of our forces to Chattanooga, you have been repeatedly informed that it would be dangerous to attempt to form a connection on the south side of the Tennessee River, and, consequently, that you ought to march on the north side. General Rosecrans has now telegraphed to you that it is not necessary to join him at Chattanooga, but only move down to such a position that you can go to his assistance, if he should require it. You are in direct communication with him, and can learn his condition and wants sooner than I can. Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object is to hold East Tennessee, by forcing the enemy south of the mountains, and barring the passes against his return.
H. W. HALLECK,
CINCINNATI, OHIO, October 1, 1863. [Received 1.50 p.m.]
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
Colonel Parsons' Ninth Tennessee, 800 strong, at Camp Nelson, has neither guns nor horses, and is ordered forward. General Burnside gave them orders for horses and arms, but they are not here. Can you send them carbines?
W. G. BROWNLOW.
KNOXVILLE, October 1, 1863-1 p.m.
Major General W. S. ROSECRANS:
All my available cavalry will be put in motion at once, to operate with yours on the north side. Would it not be better for a considerable portion of my cavalry to seize this opportunity to operate on the enemy's communications? Answer quick.
A. E. BURNSIDE.
*See Part III. p.954.