Washington, D. C., September 13, 1863-1.30 p. m.
(Received 22nd *)
I think from all accounts that Steele is sufficiently strong. All your available forces should be sent to Corinth and Tuscumbia to operate against Bragg, should he attempt to turn Rosecrans' right and recross the river into Tennessee. Send to General Sherman at Vicksburg for re-enforcements for this purpose.
General Grant, it is understood, is sick in New Orleans.
H. W. HALLECK,
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, Miss., September 13, 1863.
Major General S. A. HURLBUT,
Commanding Sixteenth Army Corps:
GENERAL: Yours of the 9th instant, inclosing copy of General Steele's communication of date the 2nd instant, is just received. General Grant has not returned from his visit to General Banks at New Orleans, but is hourly expected.
On the receipt of your communications of the 2nd and 3rd instant, relative to the probable necessity of re-enforcements for General Steele, I called on General McPherson, who ordered forward to him the division of Brigadier General John E. Smith, which, owing to the want of river transportation, did not get off until yesterday. It has no doubt reported at Helena and become subject to your orders for any destination you may deem best.
The making of Napoleon the base for General Steele's operations and supplies seems to be the best move that can be made. Whatever you do I am sure General Grant will approve, and know it is his desire that you give directions to this movement against Little Rock.
A few more troops may be spared from here if absolutely required for the success of the expedition. When General Grant returns he will write you fully.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNumbers A. RAWLINS,
Brigadier-General and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Flag-ship General Lyon, off Friar's Point, September 13, 1863.
GENERAL: Your letter to Captain Pattison in relation to the Commercial Hotel has been forwarded to me. When I was last at Memphis Dr. Grier called on me and said that he heard that the Navy had to give up the building. I remarked, "On the contrary, we
*See foot-note (*) Part I, p. 36.