mand (two brigades), Van Cleve having been ordered by General Crittenden to leave one brigade with General Wood, and the arrival of the permission to send this division, as requested, were simultaneous, and that Van Cleve marched immediately to Palmer's support, and was in a few minutes hotly engaged. (See General Van Cleve's testimony.)
It is also proven beyond doubt that General Crittenden,as soon as Van Cleve became engaged, applied to General Rosecrans for permission to bring up General Wood's command; that he obtained this permission, and immediately brought up General Wood; that General Wood became engaged at the moment of his arrival at General Crittenden's position, and so severely engaged that one of his brigades, commanded by Colonel Buell, lost in a very brief conflict 100 men killed and wounded. (See p.38.)
It is clear from the whole evidence, as well as from the official report of the commander-in-chief, that the achievements of the Twenty-first Army Corps and the orders of its commander on the 19th afford no subject for censure. That the arrival of Palmer and afterward of Van Cleve upon the left was opportune is shown not only by all the testimony, but by the rebel papers, which say that the vigorous attack resuming the offensive on that day. (See p.29)
A failure to anticipate orders on that day it is obvious would in all probability have resulted in a great disaster.
It is clearly proven that in proportion to its strength the crops of General Crittenden furnished as many men who fought throughout the battle as any other corps; that the officers and men behaved as well as any, and that the corps lost as many killed and wounded and fewer missing than any other corps. (See General Rosecrans' evidence, p.24.)
The testimony shows that General Crittenden's command was placed in reserve on the night of the 19th September; that his command was then composed of the two divisions commanded by General Van Cleve and Wood, General Rosecrans having notified General Crittenden that General Palmer would get his orders from General Thomas.
It is clear from the evidence that General Crittenden, on the 20th, was the last general officer to leave the field, and then only when there was no organized body of troops upon the field.
In the absence of charges he is at a loss to know to what points to direct explanations. Only three occur to him which could suggest themselves to any military man, and upon these he has some hesitation in commenting before a military court, explained as they are by the orders produced before this Court and by the testimony of so many officers of intelligence, including General Rosecrans.
1. In the report of General Rosecrans he speaks of the delay in relieving General Negley's command with the command of General Wood. This could not have been intended as a censure upon General Crittenden, for it is shown by General Rosecrans' evidence that his order was given directly to General Wood, and the fact afterward reported to General Crittenden. (See General Rosecrans' evidence, p.20, and also Captain Thomas', aide-de-camp, p.60.)
He will add, however, that the commanding general is mistaken in supposing if there was any delay in General Wood relieving General Negley in the line of battle that it was the cause of serious consequences later in the day, because General Wood did relieve General.