position to one farther to the rear and right, and apparently placed in reserve. About 9 o'clock the division moved forward, the regiments in double column. The First Brigade was in two lines, the Nineteenth Ohio on the right, in the front line, the Seventy-ninth Indiana on the left, the Seventeenth Kentucky supporting the Seventy-ninth, my regiment supporting the Nineteenth Ohio. The battle was then raging fiercely, the artillery fire being very heavy. I was ordered by General Beatty to move with the brigade, maintaining my relative position to the other regiments. We moved forward and to the left until we had crossed the road before spoken of, and over which we had fallen back the day before, some 300 yards. When we seemed to be but a short distance to the rear of the line that was firing, we were ordered to lied down, which order was scarcely executed before the troops in front of us gave way and literally ran over us, carrying us back with the retreating mass some 25 yards, when we rallied and moved forward at double-quick about 150 yards and took possession of a rude breastwork of logs which had been thrown up during the night by General Davis' division.
The enemy here made a most desperate attack with infantry and artillery, but did not succeed in driving us from the position. The work did not extend but a few yards to our right, and the troops to the right of it, if there were any there, soon gave way, and we again found ourselves flanked on the right, receiving a terrible fire of infantry and artillery. After an unsuccessful attempt to change front, I ordered the regiment to fall back, which it did, pursued by the enemy. We moved to the left and rear nearly half a mile, and took position on the crest of a hill overlooking the road and a flat valley, and with the fragments of several other regiments made a most desperate and successful resistance against all attempts to take the hill. From about 1 until 4 o'clock the enemy kept up an almost constant fire of musketry. Taking advantage of a short lull in the firing, I ordered barricades of such material as was most convenient to be built on the crest of the hill, and logs, stumps, and rails were scarcely piled up to the height of 2 feet before the enemy again made a most desperate attempt to take the hill. For half an hour the firing was the most terrific I had ever heard, my men firing during that time 60 rounds of cartridges, and it was only when the last cartridge was expended that I ordered my men to fall back. The enemy did not occupy the hill until the next morning. We moved off a short distance to the right, intending to rejoin the division, or such part of it as I might be able to find, but after getting to the Chattanooga road found that the army had fallen back to Rossville. I moved on to Rossville that night and the next day to Chattanooga, and reported to General Beatty.
The officers and men, without an exception, did their duty splendidly, and taking everything into consideration, they could not have done better. We entered the fight with but 187 guns, our largest company [A] having been detailed but two or three days before the fight came up as provost guard at division headquarters, and having a detail of 30 men absent with a supply train. Our loss sums up as follows:
Commissioned officers wounded ....................... 5
Enlisted men killed ................................. 1
Enlisted men wounded ................................ 40
Enlisted men missing ................................ 10
Total ............................................... 56