War of the Rebellion: Serial 050 Page 0725 Chapter XLII. THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN.

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point of attack within about five minutes after the volley, and the section of artillery followed them right up. The picket had all scattered, and no organized force could be seen in the road. The enemy had also all retired. The regiments were pushed immediately up to the place of attack and beyond, and the artillery planted on a commanding position, but no enemy could be seen. The line was halted for a few moments, during which colonel Grose brought up a regiment (the Twenty-third Kentucky) of his command and reported to me. This was placed on the left of the road, prolonging my line.

Upon consultation it was not deemed prudent to advance the line without looking to the Graysville road, which was a short distance from our left flank. At my request colonel Grose ordered up another regiment of his brigade. (Thirty-sixth Indiana) to cover the Graysville road. The lines then advanced over 1 mile, and some sharp skirmishing had with the enemy, who was finally driven off. The line remained in the latter position until about 4.15 p.m., when it was ordered back to camp. Colonel Rippey, of the Ninetieth Ohio, reports to have killed one of the enemy's cavalry in front of his skirmish line. There were no casualties on our part.

The attack on the battalion of the First Kentucky was made about 11 a.m. The battalion numbered 9 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and 144 effective men. The presence of the enemy in its immediate front was well know; the force was ample to resist the attack. The ground was unfavorable to cavalry, requiring any charge to be made in narrow column. There was not a steady resistance made, so far as can be learned. The attacking column consisted of about 80 volunteer troopers of General Pegram's command as is said by prisoners subsequently captured. The same authority states that his whole brigade was within supporting proximity. Be this as it may, but a small force was engaged or was seen. The attacking party fired but a few straggling shots. The troopers of the enemy are reported to have had scarce any sabers. Our skirmishers do not appear to have fired on the advancing column, or at most but a shot or two. The reserve of two companies fired a single volley, which, though said to have been well delivered and at short range, proved so ineffectual as not to have injured the enemy in any way.

In view of these facts, I have asked of the officers in charge of the guard a solution of the following queries:

First. How a force of 200 cavalry could break their line if posted as directed?

Second. How a volley could be fired at short range without hurting anybody?

Third. Why firing at will did not occur after the volley?

Fourth. How 58 men could be captured by cavalry without sabers in a narrow road with thick underbrush on each side?

Fifth. Why steady resistance with the bayonet was not made?

These inquiries were propounded conversationally at an interview with the officers, and reports in writing subsequently ordered from each. I herewith hand you the reports of Major [Lieutenant Colonel] Hadlock commanding Lieutenant Hammond, Lieutenant Brown, and Lieutenant Hornung, hereto appended and marked, respectively, A, B, C, and D.*


*See, respectively, pp. 742, 748, 749 and 750.