September 29, 1863.
If you will communicate a complete plan which you will engage to carry out, I will see that you have all the means in men and boats, but I want a well-digested plan before I will give an order.
J. G. FOSTER.
September 30, 1863.
There is no enemy at Amissville, and the inhabitants report that none have been there.
J. IRVIN GREGG,
ARTILLERY HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Culpeper, Va., September 30, 1863.
Brigadier General R. INGALLS,*
Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac:
GENERAL: In relation to the transportation of ammunition for the army, I have always been of opinion that it should be transported in caissons. These carriages are constructed specially to transport ammunition, and for this reason alone it might safely be assumed that they are well adapted to the service and possess special advantages. My impression on this subject has been confirmed by experience.
They system of transporting ammunition in the ordinary wagons has led to grave inconveniences. The ammunition trains are apt to be mixed up with other supply trains.
Foreseeing this, I took special pains in the organization of the Artillery Reserve ammunition train in the Peninsula. I obtained orders from General McClellan that the wagons should be covered with black water-proof covers, in order that they might be distinguished at a glance. These orders were not complied with by your predecessor, and the result was much confusion. I took special pains to keep a hundred wagon loads of artillery ammunition of the Artillery Reserve always available. At Malvern Hill, the trains of the divisions having become mingled with the other trains, it was generally found impracticable to find them. I ordered my hundred wagons upon the hill, with direction to issue to all who needed. The consequence was that battery after battery of the different corps, whose supplies were exhausted, and which could not find their own trains, had their chests replenished, and were sent to the field again. I believe this circumstance, the careful watchfulness over this train, and bringing it on to the field of battle, was one of the main causes of our success.
*See Ingalls' report, Series I, Vol. XIX, Part I, p. 105.