War of the Rebellion: Serial 047 Page 0297 Chapter XL. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.

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once the position and platform for the 8-inch rifled banded gun, which will be ready in a day or two. The batteries near the Martello Tower, already ordered, must be constructed as soon as practicable.

Can the two rifled Brooke guns in the old mortar batteries near Fort Johnson fire in the direction of Fort Sumter and to the west of it? It is important that they should be able to do so as soon as possible.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding.

SPECIAL ORDERS,

ADJT. AND INSP. GENERAL'S OFFICE, Numbers 198.

Richmond, Va., August 20, 1863.

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XIV. Brigadier General G. J. Rains will proceed without delay to Charleston, S. C., and report to General G. T. Beauregard, commanding &c., for assignment to duty.

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By command of the Secretary of War:

JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHARLESTON, S. C.,

August 21, 1863-10.45 a. m.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:

Damages to Sumter still progressing rapidly from land batteries. Fort will ere long become ineffective. Will be held, however, as long as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S.,

Richmond, Va., August 21, 1863.

Honorable W. PORCHER MILES,

Charleston, S. C.:

SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant causes me surprise and regret. In it you say:

We were, you will remember, stripped of troops, against the earnest remonstrance of General Beauregard, in order to re-enforce General Johnston. The enemy took advantage of our weakness to attack us when we could not have a sufficient force of infantry on Morris Island to effectually resist them.

I have no disposition to criticism military operations, or point out errors and omissions which can no longer be avoided or remedied, but you compel me, in self-defense, to advert to the true cause of the lodgment made by the enemy on Morris Island.

According to my conception, it was not the want of infantry force at the command of that department, but, as, I had before supposed was universally admitted, the want of adequate works of defense at