War of the Rebellion: Serial 045 Page 0957 Chapter XXXIX. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. - CONFEDERATE.

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no occasion for any disturbance or supersedure of General Elzey's command, but if driven back or obliged to occupy the defensive lines, you would then naturally, as the ranking officer, command the whole.

I do not know that to accomplish these views it will be necessary to rebuke or modify the order of mere general temporary command sent you yesterday, as the whole may be as effectually attained while you operate against the enemy in the field by leaving to General Elzey the undisturbed control of the defenses and the city.

I regret that misconception on my part may cause embarrassment or annoyance, but do not doubt you will understand it, and conform your command to the President's views as now more correctly communicated.

Very truly, yours,

J. A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,

July 2, 1863.

THOMAS D. ATKINSON,

Mayor, &c., Danville:

Organize what local force you can. Should I need them, I will telegraph for them.

J. A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,

Richmond, July 2, 1863.

Major General W. H. C. WHITING,

Wilmington:

Your information telegraphed to General Elzey must be incorrect. Foster and his force are known to have left North Carolina, and to be now in the Peninsula, threatening this city.

They have probably put out the report conveyed to you, to prevent re-enforcements and to produce diversion.

J. A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WESTERN VIRGINIA,

Dublin, July 2, 1863.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT:

Your telegram of the 29th ultimo was received here at 1 p. m. on the 30th, and forwarded to me at the Salt Sulphur Springs, where I received it early yesterday morning.

The letter of General Lee, to which I presume you refer, only suggested that I might not have a more favorable opportunity than the present to threaten Western Virginia, and, if circumstances favored, to convert the threat into a real attack; and he recommended that I should unite my available force, and strike the enemy at some vulnerable point.