[JULY, -, 1863]- 7 p. m.
GENERAL: Mr. Seddon thinks that one regiment of Cooke`s should be sent up to Hanover, and that Cooke himself should go.
Please furnish transportation for him to start at 10 o`clock with a regiment and battery of artillery.
I learn that Custis [G. W. C.] Lee has some cavalry, under Colonel [G. W.] Lay. They are picketing 12 miles inside of the Chickahominy, where they are not needed. During Baker`s absence they ought to be at Cold Harbor and Bethesda Church, watching the approaches to New Bridge, Mechanicsville, &c. Will you be kind enough to place him there?
I still understand you as I did before, that the outer line is held as a mere picket station. I understood you that [T. S.] Rhett was last night at the batteries, or third line, and now you propose to place Lee on the second line, and permit the convalescents to hold the outer line. You say that the convalescents are not reliable. If so, when they are broken through, the whole advanced position is turned, and the Yankees are in our camps and artillery parks.
Your best troops ought to be on the front line, as it is vital to hold it.
I think Custis Lee ought to have his headquarters at Stuart`s, on the Brook turnpike.
Will you be kind enough to send the inclosed telegram to General Wise?
D. H. HILL,
WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A., Richmond, [July -,] 1863.
Major General D. H. HILL,
GENERAL: The enemy seem really leaving the Peninsula. It is barely possible that it may be a feint for a sudden return. Some one or more of your brigades may probably be moved; a question not yet decided.
J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
JULY 1, 1863.
Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, C. S. A.:
I have place Baker`s regiment of cavalry at Old Church to intercept raiders coming up the Peninsula, and also to watch the Pamunkey. He has 200 dismounted men, and I understand that that number of horses have come down from Winchester. It is important that he should have them, and, if possible, that one of Jenkins` regiments should be mounted.
The line of intrenchments is so long and so badly constructed that, in case of a farther advance of the Yankees, it will be safer to concentrate our forces, and give fight outside of our works. In that view, Cooke ought to have his full brigade together. It seems to