right and rear of Hampton's brigade. Both regiments were subsequently drawn up in line of battle, to repel the advance of the enemy's columns, which finally moved to the left. One of my regiments was then ordered in that direction. I accompanied it, and, in accordance with instructions, deployed it as skirmishers, to hold that wing until re-enforcements should arrive. The other regiment remained with Hampton. My command, although opposed to the enemy during the entire day, was not at any time actively engaged. Will make a detailed report.
B. H. ROBERTSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.
Major H. B. McCLELLAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, &tc.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE, June 13, 1863.
MAJOR: In answer to yours, just received, I have the honor to make the following statement: About 2 miles this side of Kelly's Ford, at Brown's house, I think, I met Captain [William] White falling back from his picket line. He reported that five regiments of infantry and a large amount of cavalry had crossed the river, and were slowly advancing toward the railroad. Just then the enemy's line of skirmishers emerged from the woods, and I at once dismounted a large portion of my command, and made such disposition of my entire force as seemed best calculated to retard their progress. I immediately sent scouting parties to my right, and went forward myself to ascertain what was transpiring there. I soon learned that the enemy was advancing upon the Brandy Station road, and dispatched Captain [W. N.] Worthington with the information. Soon afterward, the enemy was reported marching upon Stevensburg in large force. I ordered Lieutenant [William J.] Holcombe to report the fact to the major-general commanding, who informed me that a force had been sent to Stevensburg, and that troops were at Brandy Station. Before receiving this message, I had contemplated making an attack in rear should it meet the general's approval. I therefore sent Lieutenant James Johnston to report to General Stuart, who sent me orders to hold my front. A division of my force was impossible, as I needed them all. I consider it extremely fortunate that my command was not withdrawn from the position it occupied [which was a very strong one], as the enemy's force, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, were marching directly upon the right flank of our troops engaged in front of Rappahannock Station. I had not force sufficient to hold this body in check [and it was vitally important to do so], and at the same time follow the flanking party. All the facts may be summed up as follows: Before my arrival, the enemy's cavalry had turned off to the points upon which they intended to march. They had posted artillery, cavalry, and infantry so as to cover this movement, or, if unopposed, march upon the railroad. Had I pursued the flanking party, the road I was ordered to