A strategic view is, however, advanced in this connection by General Milroy, which may perhaps, have some weight . It is this: That by holding his post nd continuing to resist the attack of the enemy until as late as Sunday night, he forced them to mass their troops at some point in his front, after which he could retreat more intelligently and safely . This view is concurred in by officers of his staff and by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, of the First New York Cavalry ; but it does not actually appear from the testimony that after the enemy had massed in the front, the detachments which occupied the roads to the north were any less in force than they had been on Saturday or Saturday night . In this connection, but one other consideration remains to be noticed . It is suggested by General Milroy at the close of his official report that the three days' delay which the stand made by him at Winchester occasioned the enemy, may have been fully worth to the country the sacrifice which it cost, and a similar view is taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt, who in answer to a question as to his opinion upon this very point, testifies, that - If the War Department and the General-in-Chief. had no other information of the movements of Lee than is indicated in the two telegrams received in Baltimore [which have been quoted above], the check that the rebels received at Winchester must have been of importance to us .
From the entire testimony as above detailed, the following conclusions are believed to be justly derived:
1 . That the General-in-Chief., prior to the attack upon Winchester, had repeatedly instructed General Schenck to maintain only a small force at that place, and to use it only as an outpost, concentrating his forces principally upon Harper's Ferry, and that General Schenck had disregarded these instructions, viewing them as suggestions merely . 2. That it was owing to General Schenck that at the time of the attack and evacuation there were at Winchester any more troops, munitions, &c., than would have been sufficient for a mere outpost . 3 That up to the time of the evacuation, General Milroy was under orders from his commanding officer, General Schenck, not to retreat at once, but to hold his post until further orders, with further orders had not been received up to the time of the evacuation, though telegraphed for by General Milroy . 4. That in giving this order, General Schenck was doubtless somewhat influenced by the representations which General Milroy himself had, in the most confident and extravagant terms, repeatedly made as to his ability to hold the post against a large force of the enemy . 5. That, further, the order of General Schenck was issued without reference to or knowledge of the fact that the army of Lee was then approaching Winchester, but in contemplation merely of an attack by he usual Valley force of the enemy or by Stuart's cavalry . 6. That the time of giving this order, General Schenck had from his superior officers no intelligence whatever of the approach of Lee ; that he received no such intelligence until it was too late for him to prevent the disaster at Winchester, and that, on the contrary, all the intelligence received by him, both from his superior and inferiors in rank, was of a nature to quiet any apprehension that he