taken as a military orders, and to be executed as such, and therefore the view of General Schenck, as expressed in his testimony, that the abandonment of Winchester was never ordered by General Halleck is an erroneous one. General Schenck further states in his testimony that his opposition to the opinion of the General-in-Chief. that Winchester should be used merely as an advanced outpost, was expressed only a view of the ordinary state of things, and of the usual force of the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and not in view of the movement of a large and overwhelming force such as Lee's army or any considerable portion of it . On the other hand, it may be noted that the instructions and directions of General Halleck conveyed a general and uniform rule of action, and are expressed apparently in special view of the possibility of a large and preponderating force of the enemy appearing in the Valley at any time . How material a circumstances was this opposition on the part of General Schenck to the views of the Commander-in-Chief, as affecting the order given to General Milroy himself in regard to the evacuation of Winchester, will now be made evident . II. The orders given General Milroy in reference to the evacuation . The first order received upon this subject by General Milroy was from Lieutenant Colonel Donn Piatt, General Schenck's chief of staff, who had been dispatched by the general to Harper's Ferry to make certain dispositions of troops. This order, which was by telegram from Harper's Ferry, and dated June 11, was received by General Milroy on the 11th, about midnight, and was expressed as follows: In accordance with orders from Halleck, received to-day, you will immediately take steps to remove your command from Winchester to Harper's Ferry . You will without delay, call in Colonel McReynolds and such other outposts not necessary for observation at the front . Send back your heavy guns, surplus ammunition, and subsistence, retaining only such force and arms as will constitute what General Halleck designated as a lookout, which can readily and without inconvenience fall back to Harper's Ferry . In reply, General Milroy at once telegraphed, remonstrating against being obliged to abandon the post, and averring that he was well prepared to hold it, and could hold it against any force that " the rebels could afford to bring against it . " As will be presently seen, this telegram [Schenck 's] was received by General Milroy before the attack of the enemy commenced, or before he was aware that Lee's army or any force other than the troops under Jones, Imboden, &c. (the usual force of the enemy in the Valley), was in his front . General Milroy, however, in view of this order, did commence to make the preparations indicated for evacuation, and it is shown that his chief quartermaster did sent off to Harper's Ferry, on the 11th, one hundred and fourteenth wagons loaded with quartermaster's stores, which for the most part arrived in perfect safety . The other wagons and quartermaster's stores were prepared for moving, when, early on Friday morning, a further order was received from General Schenck, which caused the preparations for evacuation to be discontinued . This important order, which was received early on the morning of the 12th, was as follows:
BALTIMORE, Md., June 12, 1863-1 a. m.
Lieutenant-Colonel Piatt, as I learn by copy of dispatch sent me, which he forwarded to you from Harper's Ferry, misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions . You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but hold your position in the meantime . Be ready for movement, but await further