more than you have there stated in relation to the reconnaissance ordered by you to be made to Pughtown by Captain Morgan, Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry?
Answer. I have been told that he did not go out of sight of the pickets. Lieutenant Spooner and Major Adams were two officers who told me so. I had ordered him to make a reconnaissance of the enemy on his flank. He did not start until near noon. Major Adans was with the cavalry in that direction . I have been told by others, but have forgotten who. Captain Morgan had a squadron with him.
Question. What reasons had you for expecting information of Lee's army direct from the general commanding the Army of the Potomac? Answer. General Halleck was the General-in-Chief of all the armies, and I supposed would not leave my force exposed to Lee's army without giving me information. I did not expect information from general Hooker directly, but from Generals Halleck and Schenck . I had no communication with him, excepting through Generals Halleck and Schenck. General Schenck has the original of the dispatch of the 12th of June.
Question. Did you receive any telegrams, other than those you have mentioned in your report, from General Halleck, through General Schenck.
Answer. I had correspondence with general Schenck, who informed me that General Halleck did not consider Winchester and important position. He said nothing about dispatches from General Halleck, but that the General-in-Chief did not deem it of importance; indeed, that he had called it a"post in the air", a "place not to be held against a superior force. " The above evidence was read over to General Milroy, and he received permission to add the following to his evidence: I learned from the prisoners I had taken that the enemy's force that I met on my retreat from Winchester consisted of " Allegheny" Johnson's and Rode's divisions (a part of Rodes), about 12, 000 strong. I was engaged with them about an hour. They were a portion of the forces I have previously estimated at from 40, 000 to 60, 000 strong . I consider that if the enemy had known of my retreat an hour after the evacuation of Winchester, the result would have been more disastrous, as they would have overtaken and attacked us in overwhelming force. After Friday at noon I would have been able to have reached the martinsburg road, but after the same hour on Saturday, without encountering the enemy.
By the Judge-Advocate:
Question . What was the number of your missing during your retreat from Winchester?
Answer. About 2, 00.
By the court:
Question. If you brought away all the horses, why was not the harness of the artillery and baggage wagons brought off?
Answer . Because some of the teamsters took their harness off and left it. Some of the teamsters and some of the horses were captured during the confusion and scattering caused by the enemy's fire.
By the Judge-Advocate:
Question. Did your order any of the harness to be brought off . Answer. I directed the quartermaster to that effect . I think I directed him to bring away, if he could do so without making a noise or encumbering the march. The court then adjourned to meet at 11 a. m. August 18, 1863.