we were fighting something more than we had fought during tho winter and spring; I knew that was attacked by a superior force, but did not think it was Lee's army.
Question. When was the attack made in force?
Answer. The main attack was on Sunday evening, the 14th. we had been fighting two days before that, on the outside of the town, but they did not attack in force until Sunday evening, near 6 o'clock.
Question. What disposition of troops was made from the defense of Winchester?
Answer . I had the heights near Winchester; I had earthworks. My main fortifications would contain 3, 000 or 3, 500 men. I had a number of small forts on that range of hills, and about 1, 000 yards farther on I had another range, not entirely finished, but capable of affording a good shelter for troops when attacked. I supposed that with my fortifications I was able to stand some two or three times my own forces. By the Court:
Question. What was the known or supposed strength of the enemy, and what was that of the Federal troops?
Answer. In addition to what is stated in my report, I have learned from citizens of Winchester, prisoners who were captured, and men of my own command who were paroled by the enemy, that they were from 40, 000 to 50, 000 strong, and had eighty pieces of artillery ranged on my works-none put their number at less than 40. 000 ; Ewell's corps, and the forces of Jones and Imboden. Longstreet's corps was between them and Front Royal, in supporting distance. I had 6, 900 effective men; my total force was about 9, 000 men.
Question. What orders were given in relation to Government property in event of a retreat?
Answer. My orders were not to permit any more than five days' stores there at any one time. I received orders from General Schenck to send off surplus stores, and be ready to fall back at the first intimation. In accordance thereto, I sent off my surplus stores; over one hundred wagons reached Harrisburg.
Question. What precautions were taken to secure the public property?
Answer. Those I have named . I had everything loaded upon wagons, ready to bring away, but not dreaming of being surrounded by such a heavy force, and supposing I would receive orders, I supposed I could take my trains back to Harper's ferry. I merely waited orders to move, when I found myself surrounded by such a mass of the enemy. On Sunday Night, when I found the enemy around me, I called a council of war, and it was determined to cut our way out. At the time my artillery ammunition was nearly exhausted and my provisions nearly so. On Sunday night, we left that if we moved a wheel or made the least noise the enemy would fall upon us in overwhelming numbers. They had our range, and we knew that our safety was in moving out quietly, leaving our wagons and artillery in their hands. We spiked the artillery and crippled the carriages by cutting the wheels. They could not have been destroyed by fire without giving the enemy our position.
Question. In what order did the troops retire, or were there any instructions given as to how the retreat should be conducted? Answer. There were. The advance was led by General Elliott. The troops were directed to keep up in regular marching order by fours, with once cavalry regiment in advance, as we apprehended a force in front, but more on the rear and flank. I placed two cavalry regiments in the rear. As we had expected to encounter afforce, I had ordered a vigorous and rapid attack, so as to break through suddenly. This program was carried out to some extent. Our artillery and wagons horses were brought off. We did not leave a horse behind fit for service . There were about 1, 000 Government horses mounted by teamsters, contraband, and sick soldiers on the flank. The first attack came from the front 4 and 1/2 miles from the town.
Question. Were you present at the commencement of the main attack, and were you on the ground during its continuance?
Answer. I was. Everything was done under my own eye.