General Meade speaks of another attack in a different part of the field at about the same hour, as follows: On the extreme left another assault was, however, made about 8 p. m. on the Eleventh Corps from the leftof the town, which we repulsed with the assistance of the Second and
First Corps. The similarity of time and circumstances leads me to think that there is a mistake in locality of this attack. It is quite certain that Greene was attacked and was re-enforced by the First and Eleventh Corps about the same hour that the report says that the attack on the Eleventh Corps was repulsed by aid of troops from the First and Second Corps. Be that as it may, the defense made by General Greene was eminently worthy of notice and commendation.
3. In wholly ignoring the operations of the First Division, Twelfth Corps. The active participation of the Twelfth Corps in the battle of Gettysburg was, first, the marching of the First Division and Lockwood's brigade to the support of the left on Thursday afternoon, July 2; secondly, the defense of the left flank of the intrenched line on the evening of the same day; and, thirdly, the long contest on Friday morning, July 3, to recover possession of our line of breastworks. I have spoken of both operations of Thursday. Of those of Friday morning, General Meade thus speaks in his report: On the morning of the 3d, General Geary, having returned during the night, was attacked at early dawn by the enemy, but succeeded in driving him back and occupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, re-enforced by Wheaton's [a mistake for Shaler's] brigade, Sixth Corps, maintained his position, and inflicting very severe losses on the enemy. With this exception, the lines remained undisturbed, &c. This is certainly neither a full nor a fair statement of a conflict which was waged almost without cessation for fully seven hours, and in which all the infantry and artillery of the corps were engaged. The idea conveyed by General Meade's report is a simple defense by one division of the corps. The engagement really began on our side by a heavy cannonading from guns placed in position after midnight. The plan of attack, arranged the night before, to dislodge the enemy from our breastworks, was for Geary's division to follow the cessation of artillery firing by an attack along the intrenchments which he held on our left, while the First Division was placed in preparation to assault over the marshy grounds on the extreme right, or attack the enemy's flank should he attempt to move beyond the breastworks. The enemy, on the other hand, had brought up strong re-enforcements, with the design of carrying the position of our intrenched line, which he failed to drive Greene from on the previous night, and which would have placed him in the rear of our army, and night, and given him possession of our main line of communication-the Baltimore pike. Both parties started at daylight with plans of attack, each with the expectation of expelling the other. Not only, as General Meade's report says, did Geary's division (or, more correctly, the two absent brigades of it) return during the night, but so also did the whole of the First Division and Lockwood's brigade, and the whole corps (not Geary's division alone), artillery and infantry, succeeded in driving the enemy back and occupying its former position. It is a noticeable fact, too, that the portion of the corps not mentioned by General Meade lost more in killed and wounded in this contest, from its exposed line of attack, and, I think, captured