would tend, I hoped, to re-establish confidence. I yielded because I was satisfied the good of the service demanded it.
On the morning of May 3, being the rear division, I established my line, with Rodes' and Iverson's brigade, on left of Plank road as before, Ramseur's brigade on the right, then Doles', and finally Colquitt on the extreme right. The attack was renewed about 6 a. m., and soon after I received orders to move forward, which I promptly obeyed, first giving directions to each brigade commander to push forward until the enemy was encountered, and engage him vigorously, moving over friend and foe alike, if in the way.
At the moment of starting, our cavalry reported a strong demonstration of the enemy on our extreme left, and Colquitt was detached to oppose it. He was subsequently moved to the extreme right, to support a portion of General A. P. Hill's troops, and ultimately got heavily and handsomely engaged on the left of my division, as will be seen hereafter. On account of the dense forest, the undulating character of the ground, and the want of an adequate staff, it was not in my power, during the subsequent movements, to give a great deal of personal attention to the actions of any of my command, except Rodes' and Ramseur's brigades, which were next to the road, but my orders were faithfully executed by each brigade commander.
Moving forward steadily, with no material stoppage except that occasioned by the tangled undergrowth, they soon encountered a heavy fire of artillery. Pressing on, they soon overtook the second line of battle, then at a halt, except the Stonewall Brigade, which was moving, under orders, from the left to the right of the Plank road. I ordered Colonel [E. A.] O' Neal not to wait on this movement, but to advance his brigade over the second line. At this moment, Colonel O'Neal was disabled by a fragment of a shell, and in person I made his right regiment (the Third Alabama) press forward through the troops, and sent a staff officer with directions to Colonel [J. M.] Hall, who succeeded to the command, to continue his advance. The first line was in turn overtaken and passed, but the confusion arising from passing the two lines caused the two regiments on the left of this brigade to become separated from the others. These two moved obliquely to the right, under the immediate command of Colonel Hall, and encountered the fire of the enemy's infantry, posted behind a barricade on the right of the road, and not more than 200 yards from the epaulements on the heights. At this juncture, a portion of Iverson's brigade and a portion of Pender's troops, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Pender, coming up, he ordered them all forward. The enemy was compelled to abandon the barricade and fall back, and, pressing on, Colonel Hall's two regiments (the Fifth and Twenty-sixth Alabama), together with the Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment, Colonel [D. H.] Christie, carried the heights in magnificent style, planting their flags inside the works. In this charge the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel [John S.] Garvin, of the Twenty-sixth Alabama, fell, desperately wounded, inside the works.
In the meantime the residue of Rodes', Iverson's, and Pender's troops, moving forward to the left of Hall and Christie, were met and repulsed by the enemy, thus leaving the flank of the party on the heights exposed to an overwhelming force. They were compelled to fall back behind the Plank road, with the loss of over 100 men and both Alabama flags.
A second line of battle having been assembled along the log breastworks on the left of the road, composed of parts of the Third, Sixth, and