tured or missing, and 388 horses killed and disabled, horse artillery not included.
I respectfully refer to the reports of commanders of artillery, corps, and of the generals with whom they served for the names of those who have distinguished themselves for gallantry and good conduct.
To the officers of my staff-Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Warner and Major Alexander Doull, inspectors of artillery, who were each charged with separate commands, at different points, as already stated; Captain J. N. Craig, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant C. T. Bissell, aide-de-camp-my thanks are due for the gallantry and efficiency with which they discharged the duties devolved upon them. Those of Lieutenant Bissell, my only aide, were necessarily arduous and always performed with promptitude.
To Colonel Wainwright, First New York Artillery, who was placed by the commanding general in charge of all the artillery on the 3rd; Captain C. L. Best, Fourth [U. S.] Artillery, who took charge of the batteries not in the line of battle on the 4th, and of the posting and commanding of such batteries as were needed to cover the withdrawal of the army, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan (captain Fourt [U. S.] Artillery) for assistance given me of the field, I beg to make my acknowledgments.
In justice to the artillery, and to myself, I think it necessary to state certain circumstances affecting its condition and losses in these operations. The command of the artillery, which I held under Generals McClellan and Burnside, and exercised at the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg, was withdrawn from me when you assumed command of the army, and my duties made purely administrative, under circumstances very unfavorable to their efficient performance. I heard after the movement commenced that, when the corps were put in motion to cross the river, they left part of their artillery in their camps. No notice of this was given to me, and it was only by accident that I learned that the batteries so left behind were afterward ordered to rejoin their corps. As soon as the battle commenced on Friday morning, I began to receive demands from corps commanders for more artillery, which I was unable to comply with, except partially, and at the risk of deranging the plans of other corps commanders. That same morning I was ordered to Banks' Ford, to take command there, and was absent at that place until the night of the 3rd from general headquarters.
The promotion of many of the old artillery officers, and the invariable transfer which accompanied it to other duties, weakened the regular batteries exceedingly, and at the same time deprived the divisional artillery of experienced commanders. The limitation of officers of fourgun batteries crippled the volunteer service, and the want of field officers added to the great difficulties under which the arm labored. It will, perhaps, hardly be believed that for the command and management in their operations of the artillery of the army, consisting of 412 guns, 980 artillery carriages, 9,543 men and officers, and 8,544 horses, besides their large ammunition trains, there were but five field officers of artillery in the army, and from the scarcity of officers of inferior grades these officers had miserably insufficient staffs. Add to this that there was no commander of all the artillery until a late period of the operations, and I doubt if the history of modern armies can exhibit a parallel instance of such palpable crippling of a great arm of the service in the very presence of a powerful enemy, to overcome whom would require every energy of all arms under the most favorable circumstances. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that confusion and mismanagement ensued, and it is creditable to the batteries themselves, and to the officers who