tion by General Jackson was excellent, though the lateness of the day in which his blow was struck gave him but little advantage of the maneuver, except so far as it facilitated his safe retirement to Gordonsville.
Thus the day closed; Jackson's desperate assault was foiled; the Eleventh Corps, though routed, was saved from destruction, and the First Corps had just joined to take its place in the line. The position of the Third Corps and our cavalry, on the right flank of Jackson's cavalry, cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with General Lee's right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our side, and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive battle. By our leaving a sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it. To render the success more complete, General Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps (about 20,000 strong), was to leave his position in front of the enemy's lines at Fredericksburg and fall upon General Lee's rear at daybreak. The information obtained from persons we had captured rendered it probable that the enemy had withdrawn all his force, except enough to keep up a mere show at Fredericksburg, for a decisive blow upon our divided army at Chancellorsville. Instructions to this effect were sent by telegraph and also by Captain [Valerian] Razderichin to General Sedgwick to move at once. Knowing much of the road that General Sedgwick would thus have to march over in the night, I advised that I should go and guide the column, and give such information and assistance as I could, and I was directed to do so.
I set out from headquarters with Lieutenant James about 10.30 p. m., and reached General Sedgwick at the crossing of the river at 3 a. m. on May 3. As I passed down, I saw the enemy's camp-fires at Banks' Ford, and occasional ones along the bluff from Marye's Hill, southeastward to the Massaponax Creek. When I arrived, General Newton's division, which had been given the advance, had begun its movement, and firing was going on among the pickets. The enemy seemed so to inclose our force with his sentinels that it was impossible to move without drawing their fire, which slight resistance caused frequent halts to our whole column. At daylight the head of the column of the Sixth Corps had not yet passed out of the city. The small force of the enemy in it had then withdrawn to the hills, and the inhabitants as they awoke were surprised to find our troops in possession.
Daylight enabled me to see, as I thought, satisfactorily, that there were not more than two field-pieces on Marye's Heights and no infantry in the rifle-pits to our right of it. The stone-wall breastwork at its foot was occupied; by how large a force it was difficult to ascertain, as our skirmish line had been repulsed on approaching it. At this time the Sixth Corps was disposed as follows: General Brooks' division along the road, covering the bridge-head and closely watched by the enemy in his front; General Howe's division confronting the force on the hill southeast of Hazel Run; General Newton's extended to the right as far as the Telegraph road in Fredericksburg; forming a continuous line of battle of about 2 miles front along the road.
General Gibbon's division of the Second Corps, about 2,500 strong, began to cross on a pontoon bridge soon after sunrise, and the sound of the renewed conflict began to reach us. In company with General Gibbon, I reconnoitered the ground to the right, to attempt to gain the heights there. Here there are two canals to cross, one near the river, the other near the foot of the hills. On the first, the bridge remained intact and could be crossed at once. I waited on the other side of this what