As soon as the enemy's pickets were encouraged, it seems General McCulloch formed his brigade in line of battle and advanced upon the enemy, who were posted behind the hedges, so as to fie through the openings. Upon reaching the hedges it was found utterly impracticable to pass them except through the few openings left for convenience by the planter. In dong this, the order of battle was necessarily broken, and the frequently With which this became necessary before reaching the first levee, behind which the enemy ins superior force was found posted exposed the brigade to a falling fire while broken in column in order to pass through the opening in the hedge. Owing to these frequent interruptions in the advance in the order of battle, the brigade reached the open space between the last hedge and the first levee, about 25 paces in width, in some confusion, and the ensemble of the movement upon the enemy's position was thus necessarily lost, the deficient regiments having reached his open space at different periods. Notwithstanding the galling and destructive fire of the enemy, three regiments were formed and led against the enemy, secretly posted being the first levee, drove them from its cofer, and followed them across the open space between the two levees, using the bayonet freely. At the second levee, however, our men encountered the main force of the enemy, entirely covered form our fire, and alter a gallant effort to carry this position, were compelled to fall back behind the first levee, which we continued to hold until the wounded were sent to the rear, and the men, exhausted by the excessive heat of the day and want of water, were withdrawn in good order by General McCulloch. Rands's brigade, which, by General Taylor's orders was held in reserve 6 miles from the field,, was hastened forward, upon Brigadier-General McCulloch's the field, was hastened forward, upon Brigadier-General McCulloch's request for re-enforcements, but did not reach the scene of action until General McCulloch, having several times failed to carry the SECOND levee, and drawn off this brigade.
In the mean time the enemy's gunboats had taken position so as to rake the open space between the SECOND levee and the river With grape and canister, and had our men succeed in gaining the open space the enemy by retiring to the water's edge, would have give their gunboats complete command of the position. Under such circumstance it would have been folly to have persisted in the attack, which could only have resulted in a fearful sacrifice of life, and after making a personal reconnaissance, as far as practicable, and otherwise gaining, the best information possible, I determined not to order another assault, but having sent off the wounded and rested the troops for several hours near the battle-field in the cool of the evening withdrew the two brigades, sending McCulloch's back to this place and taking post With Randal's 4 miles in advance, to core the road along which General Hawes's brigade would return form Young's Point.
In regard to the operations of the brigade of the last-named officer, I have only to remark that my orders to him were peremptory to attack the enemy at Young's Point. Our information of the strength and position of the enemy at that place was so recent, and as though so entirely reliable, that I did not taking it necessary to attach any conditions to this order. The failure to carry out my instructions can only be defended by the existence or circumstance entirely at variance With those suppericous hours in finding a bridge, which would have brought on the attack in the heat of abn excessively hot day, the exhausted condition of the men, who would have gone into action under a burning sun after an almost continuos march of nearly 30 miles the strong position of the