The above, general, is all that I can say in regard to the orders I carried during the day. I gave a full copy of my diary for the day to Lieutenant-Colonel [L. M.]Montgomery, who has left it with his papers in Demopolis.
I am general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. McRAE SELPH,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.
Lieutenant General J. C. PEMBERTON.
DEMOPOLIS, ALA., July 29, 1863.
After line of battle was formed, I forward to line of skirmishers (cavalry), to ascertain, if possible, on what point the enemy was moving his heaviest force. Colonel [Wirt] Adams, commanding, thought the main attack would be on our left, bud seemed no to be confirmed in this belief. The skirmishing was equally severe on the right and left, and no definite conclusion could be formed as to which was the advance of the bulk of the enemy's force. A SECOND time I went to Colonel Adams, conveying the order for him, when forced to retire, to ball back with his whole command in front of the strongest column of the enemy. At this time (I should think about 9 a. M.) I found Colonel Adams with all his cavalry about retiring on a by-road just to the left of the Raymond road. The infantry skirmishers in this road and on its right I ordered to retire, as their flank was exposed on the left by the withdrawal to he calvary. My next message of importance was to General Stevenson-after the skirmishing had become very fierce on his front, and when the enemy seemed to be wavering and the fire three somewhat receding-to advance at once if the enemy faltered and push him vigorously. This, I should judge, was at 12,30 o'clock. General Bowen (in the center) and General Loring (on the right)were ordered to advance together on the force in their front and drove them from position. This order I carried myself to General Bowen, and heard in sent several times by different staff officer to General Loring. We were looking every moment for the advance, not comprehending why there was delay, until after some time (say three-fourths of an hour) since the order had been first sent. General Bowen rode up and said be was merely waiting to see the left of General Loring's DIVISION advance to put his command in motion (this explanation he had before sent by an officer), and seemed to feel confident of his ability to drive the enemy before him, and said further, that he understood from General Loritn that the enemy seemed so strong in his (General Loring's)front that he would wait, hopping that they would advance and attack him in his position-a strong one. Meanwhile Stevenson (on the left) was hard pressed, and called for reenforcements. Bowen was ordered to his support, and Loring to move to the left with two brigades to take Bowen's position in the center; this about 1. 30 or 2 o'clock. This important order I heard ungently and repeatedly sent, and two or three of General Loring's staff officers who rode up meantime were sent immediately back with these instructions. There seemed to be great deal in obeyed this order. No movement was made from the left of the center, which was very much exposed during this interval. I was then absent from General Pemberton for, I suppose, two hours, urging the troops to the, advance, and endeavoring