sissippi outside of the levee, and this levee was effectually commanded by the gin. I ordered the attack, and after a struggle of about an hour the rebels were driven out of the gin, leaving one lieutenant (Mr. English) dead in our hands. In order to hold this important place, I moved the whole of the Sixty-NINTH Indiana and two mountain howitzers to the gin, securing that place against an attack in front by a system of barricades, and by cutting a deep and wide ditch across the levee. This seemed necessary, as I had learned that the enemy at Perkins' had, in addition to 700 to 900 cavalry, a six-gun battery, and had been on the 5th instant re-enforced by the First Missouri Infantry, Confederate forces, while it would have been indiscreet on my part to risk any other artillery than the mountain howitzers at New Carthage until I had positive information that the enemy's gunboats, Webb and Queen of the WEST, were not in these waters- a question which I could not get answered.
In order to keep up a secure communication with Richmond and Milliken's Bend, and to protect the levees and roads against injury by the enemy's hands, I made, with the approbation of the major-general commanding the Thirteenth Army Corps, the following disposition of the troops:
The place of the Sixty-NINTH Indiana Infantry, now at James' (and leaving only the Forty-NINTH Indiana Infantry at Smith's), was filled by the One hundred and twentieth Ohio Infantry and Seventh Michigan Battery; the Seventh Kentucky Infantry, at Surget's, and the One hundred and eighteenth Illinois Infantry, at Holmes'. The SECOND Brigade, Colonel L. A. Sheldon commanding, was to be left at Richmond, together with the First Wisconsin Battery, one regiment being pushed forward to ----'s plantation and another to Menott's. By this disposition of the enemy was threatened in front by the force at James', and on the flank by the cavalry detachments at Dunbar's. The latter were very annoying to the enemy, cutting them off entirely from all their resources in the way of subsistence, my patrols extending over all the country WEST to the Tensas River, and securing everything available for our own benefit- so much so that my command lived almost entirely on the country. For these reasons the rebels kept always a large force opposite Dunbar's, annoying my men by an occasional shot. To stop this, I ordered Major [Bacon] Montgomery, of the Sixth Missouri Cavalry, to bring his mountain howitzers to the above point on the 7th instant and shell them at daybreak. This order was executed, and the enemy left pell-mell.
The following day at 11 o'clock the enemy attacked my position at James', bringing two 12-pounder howitzers within 800 yards, and cannonading my men for about three-quarters of an hour. Nobody hurt. The enemy, seeing no result, and afraid to come within range of my infantry, left for their camp again.
On April 9, Lieutenant Stickel, of the SECOND Illinois Cavalry, whom I had ordered to scour diligently all the country in front of the cavalry in a northwesterly direction, fell in with a recruiting party of the enemy, consisting of 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 1 sergeant-major, 1 private, and one civilian. Lieutenant Stickel captured them all, and brought them in, with the exception of a sergeant-major, who attempted to run away and was badly wounded, and afterward paroled.
By this time (April 10) the practicability of the route to New Carthage was recognized by headquarters, and other DIVISIONS were ordered to