ceipt of this prohibition, I telegraphed the Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond:
If I cannot control the railroads in this department, the business of the department and subsistence of the troops will fail. I beg that Colonel [William M.] Wadley may be sent here at once.
Arrangements had been made, as already stated, as fully as the means at my disposal would admit, to transfer supplies from Snyder's Mill to Vicksburg, and the chief of subsistence was positively directed to keep constantly on hand a supply for not less than sixty days. Similar instructions were given to the chief quartermaster of the department. Every possible effort was made to carry out my orders. If I failed in the full accomplishment of my wishes, it was from circumstances utterly beyond my control. It must be remembered that almost continuous movements of troops and ordnance were necessary, in consequence of the persistent efforts of the enemy from about the middle of December to the date of the investment of Vicksburg.
About February 10, the enemy began his movement through the Yazoo Pass. None but our smallest boats could be employed in the upper waters from this date until the enemy abandoned his designs, not only by the Pass and Tallahatchee, but also by the Sunflower and Deer Creek, The boats which were employed in bringing down supplies from those small streams were frequently and necessarily diverted to the transportation of troops and munitions of war. Early in February, also, the enemy succeeded in passing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg. This at once rendered the navigation of the Mississippi and Red Rivers dangerous, and from that time forth it was only by watching opportunities and at great risk of capture that supplies could be thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg; nevertheless, large amounts were successfully introduced into both places (into the latter via Big Black). Port Hudson, howuch the larger portion, being easier of access. In addition to the efforts made by agents under my own instructions to supply Port Hudson, the chief of subsistence of the department was ordered on February 18 to furnish Major-General Gardner's commissary with ample funds to meet the demands of the service.
About the middle of the same month, believing it to be highly probable that not only the subsistence of my own army but also that of General Bragg's might be dependent upon the supplies of the country intersected by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, I issued positive orders that neither grain nor meat should be allowed to leave the department by that road. The condition of the Southern Railroad daily growing worse in consequence of the heavy rains and its light structure, every effort was made on my part to aid the managers in its speedy and effectual repair. A communication urging its importance in a military point of view was addressed to His Excellency the Governor of the State, of February 20, asking his assistance by the impressment of negroes to labor on it, the vice-president having informed me that planters would not hire their hands.
On February 28 and on March 2, instructions were again sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwell to purchase all the meat possible at the price suggested by him, and [he was] notified also that beef could then be crossed safely, and to send forward all he could control.
March 1, Brigadier-General Ruggles was directed by telegraph as follows:
You must give every possible assistance in procuring within your district all the