than himself how much he is indebted to that forbearance. Neither will I undertake to show that he is indebted to the good conduct of officers and men of his command at different times for the series of successes that have gained him applause rather than to his own merit as a commander, unless he should challenge it, too. It will suffice in this connection to say that while I have been and still am proud of the honors that have been conferred upon him as my commander, I only regret that he should use the influence he has acquired [in a considerable degree through the efforts of citizen soldiers] for any purpose less commendable than the promotion of the public good.
General Grant's report appears to have two objects-one to give an account of the operations of his army, the other to disparage me; and any one who will carefully and candidly read it, can hardly fail to perceive that in a persistent effort to do the latter he has interrupted the logical and orderly development of the former and marred the symmetry of an official document. Take, for example, his narrative of the assault of May 22 upon the defenses of Vicksburg. He says:
All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated the three army corps, then in front of the enemy's works, commenced the assault.
* * * * * * * * *
The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works would cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability ultimately to succeed.
Here is a clear and unequivocal admission that all the corps and their commanders did their duty-their whole duty; that their conduct was gallant in the extreme; that the assault failed with much loss in killed and wounded of our men, and only because the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken by assault. Yet, in juxtaposition and in contradiction to this clear and unmistakable admission, he goes on to argue, through a longer space than that devoted to the legitimate account of the assault, that I sent false dispatches, and thereby caused Sherman and McPherson to make an assault, resulting-
in the increase of our mortality list full 50 per cent, without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.
Again, he says:
Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line, or in repelling a sortie.
No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works, with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of Twenty-first [Twenty-SECOND] Regiment Iowa Volunteers, and some 11 privates of same regiment. Of these none returned except the sergeant and possibly 1 man. The work entered by him from its position could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time. About 12 m. I received a dispatch from McClernand that he was hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode around to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a SECOND dispatch from McClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of, and still held, two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent an answer to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his assistance.