existence of his army depends. The general's foresight was equal to the emergency. It saved the supplies of the army and thus saved the country. Thus far his sagacity and a kind Providence has favored us. The failure of their first movement will not, however, prevent future efforts to accomplish the same result. It is evident the enemy does not intend to fight General Bragg in his present position. If he had intended so to do he would have advanced upon the general before his army was strengthened and his position fortified. The loss the general inflicted upon the enemy at Murfreesborough was to terrible that he will not, under the circumstances, renew the conflict. If General Bragg fights in front of his position, he will have to advance and fight the enemy behind his works.
The policy of the enemy is changed. He intends to lie in the general's front, and keep the attention of his army occupied, while, with his cavalry and outside organizations, he ruins the country to the left and rear. The Tuscumbia region is the gateway for all movements based upon the new policy. To meet this new system of tactics of the enemy, will not the general have to charge his position? Will he not be forced to provide against a repetition of this recent movement? Fortified as General Bragg is, can he not detach a force of a division of infantry and Forrest's cavalry for the purpose of protecting his left and rear? His rear is the heart of the South. If he will give me such command, I will hold the enemy at Corinth in check, will rapidly increase my force, and in the end clear that point. This force and disposition will prevent an advance of the enemy down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, as it will flank any such movement. Occupying that position, promising an ultimate advance into West Tennessee, I can draw to my force a large proportion of the district population, and thus augment the command.
The position west of Tuscumbia, on Bear Creek, as the general is doubtless aware, is naturally strong, and is capable of being made almost impregnable. This position, arresting an advance down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, would protect General Pemberton's rear and the black land region on the Tombigbee River, from which his supplies are mainly drawn. This position would much more efficiently protect Columbus, Aberdeen, Okolona, and Northern Mississippi than can the small forces scattered along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Draw up these forces to the position on Bear Creek, and unite with the forces suggested, and no advance on Mobile Railroad would be possible. I throw out these suggestions for his consideration. Without amplification, he can see and comprehend their force and whatever of value they possess. I will run up and see him, if he deems these suggestions of value sufficient to desire fuller information of the country, locality, &c.
GID. J. PILLOW,
Brigadier General C. S. Army, Chief of Bureau, Army of Tennessee.
KNOXVILLE, TENN., May 5, [1863.]
Colonel B. S. EWELL, Assistant Adjutant-General, Tullahoma:
What re-enforcements (cavalry) can be sent to Pegram by General Bragg? Will Colonel Chenault be ordered to report to him? I desire, if possible, to re-establish the cavalry on the Cumberland.
DABNEY H. MAURY,