an effective force of 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry. If, with all his available men, Marmaduke were thrown across the Arkansas, by a preconcerted arrangement McCray could join him, swelling his force to some 7,000 men. With this force he should break up the road, destroy the rolling stock, and maintain himself in the country as long as possible, doing all in his power to break the communications of the enemy entirely. This, if the river does not soon rise, any compel the evacuation of Little Rock. You might co-operate with Marmaduke in his operations by threatening Little Rock with your infantry force. This is the only feasible plan of operations that suggests itself to me, unless the enemy has greatly weakened his force by sending re-enforcements to Rosecrans.
The importance of accurate and complete information from within the enemy's lines is so great that I will again urge upon you to spare neither trouble nor expense in obtaining it. Any successful plan of operations must be based upon accurate knowledge of the enemy's strength and movements. From you reports I am uncertain as to the enemy's force, and cannot tell whether he has been weakened or re-enforced since his occupation of Little Rock. If he has been largely drawn upon for re-enforcements, and is not numerically stronger than yourself, I would recommend the occupation of Pine Bluff with your whole force and the operation with a portion of your cavalry upon the enemy's communications. This will force the enemy either to evacuate Little Rock or to move down and attack you in position. You can subsist yourself from the valley of the Lower Arkansas, and, should you decline giving battle, have a safe line of retreat (even though the river rose) by Monticello, along Bayou Bartholomew to Monroe, through a country abundant in supplies.
Taylor and Magruder both have their hands full, and will be occupied during the winter; but even could their hands full, and will be occupied the distance is so great that they could not be made available for a winter campaign. I have thrown out these suggestions, and wish you to give me your views and determination as early as practicable. I desire, previously to any movement, to come up and see the troops and remain a short time with them.
Your obedient servant,
[E. KIRBY SMITH,]
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE INDIAN TERRITORY,
Doaksville, November 30, 1863.
Gov. SAMUEL GARLAND:
GOVERNOR: I have received a communication from headquarters sent to Bonham, Tex., for the use of the Choctaw militia, to be drawn on requisitions approved by myself-the ammunition consists of powder, lead, caps, and flints, also that you had been recommended to organized all within certain ages (eighteen and forty-five) into regiments for the Confederate service, and those under and over these ages into companies for local defense. The ammunition ordered for this purpose has not yet arrived, but, no doubt, will soon. In the mean time there is sufficient at Washita, as I directed my ordnance officer to inform you last month. The sooner all the available force of the Choctaw Nation is put in readiness the better. The indications from the north leave it doubtful whether or not the enemy will advance from Fort Smith to Red River