signal should be given. Their plan was to maintain their ground in Missouri, if possible, and, if not, to make the best of their way into Arkansas. They were promised, and to some extent received, co-operation from the enemy's stores in the latter State. So extensive was their organization that, notwithstanding the discovery and partial prostration of the scheme, not less than 10,000 guerrillas were at one time in arms in Missouri. Aware of the impending danger, I called upon the United States Government for more troops. The reply was that not a single regiment could be furnished. There was nothing left, then, but to call forth the latent power of the State to save her from the horrors of guerilla war, and to preserve the authority of the United States within her borders. I therefore availed myself of my position as brigadier-general of the Missouri militia, and called upon the Government for authority to enroll and organize all the militia of the State, and to call into active service such force as I might deem necessary. This authority was readily granted, and the work immediately commenced.
With the immense difficulties which lay in the way of its successful prosecution, arising from the apprehension and distrust excited in the minds of the people, both loyal and disloyal, and the doubts existing in the minds of many of the success of so great an experiment, tried for the first time in the country, your board are, perhaps, as familiar as myself. Its final triumph and happy results are known to every one in Missouri.
Not the least of the difficulties to be overcome was to provide the means for arming and subsisting this force. Some arms were furnished by the United States, but soon this source failed. Subsistence was entirely denied. I was, therefore, again thrown upon my own resources to provide the means for performing the duty assigned me by the Government, viz, "to take care of Missouri?" Under these circumstances I determined that those who, by their open or secret aid and encouragement to the rebellion, had brought upon the State so great a calamity should bear the extraordinary expense necessary to bring back a state of peace and prosperity, and at the same time be made to realize that such crimes could not be committed with impunity. The mode of accomplishing this was a matter for careful consideration, particularly whether it should be done under State of Federal authority. The money was to be chiefly used for the support of a State force, for whose maintenance the United States were in no way responsible, and provided for by no law of Congress. The State was entirely without means to meet such expense, and I was so informed by the Governor. On the other hand, this force was called into existence solely to enable me to discharge the important and difficult duty assigned me by the United States Government, and to enable me and my predecessors to accomplish which we had been intrusted with all powers of martial law. There was manifestly no other law, either State or Federal, under which the money required could be raised for the specific purpose, either by assessment of disloyal persons or otherwise, nor by which those guilty of aiding in bringing calamity upon the State could be made to feel the sting of just retribution before it should be too late to produce good results. It was, therefore, manifest that the order should spring from United States authority, the source of martial law. Hence the order was issued from "Headquarters District of Missouri," and possessed whatever of force I could give it in my capacity as representative of the military power of the United States in Missouri.
The above is substantially an answer to all your questions. I acted in this, as in all other matters, upon my own responsibility as an officer