bayou on the other side, and find, if possible, what Glover's position was with reference to mine. On reaching the bayou, I found to my surprise that it was full of water, except just at the mouth, and apparently impassable. Riding a little farther, I found that the left of Glover's line of skirmishers was very considerably in rear of my right, and was overshooting the enemy into my line. I immediately sent an order to the whole of my line to move forward and drive the enemy from his position, informing Major Rogers that his right was protected by the bayou. Shortly after, on my way back, I was overtaken by the general, and informed him of the state of the case, and asked to have the left of Glover's line notified. The line moved forward as directed, driving the enemy from the corn-field and across the bayou; at the same time Glover had upon his side, as I was informed by the general, pushed back the right of their line, and they at once limbered up their guns and retired their whole line together. I pushed up to and over the bayou, and reconnoitered the corn-field in front, without finding anything.
The road here makes a sharp turn to the right, and runs along the bayou until, reaching the turn of the bayou, it intersects the right-hand road, upon which Glover was marching. While reconnoitering the ground in my front and right, I received a message from the general, saying that Glover passed the intersection of the two roads, and directing me to bring up my brigade in column in rear of Glover's (Second) brigade and Ritter's (Third) brigade, protecting the rear and left flank. I had meanwhile informed the general of the disposition I had made of my force- the Eighth behind the bayou, with Stange's section of howitzers, to prevent any attempt of the enemy to recross the bayou, and Merrill's Horse, on Glover's left flank, protecting his left. This latter movement was not well executed, from ignorance of the topography of the country and the direction of the main road. The Eighth was now withdrawn, and the brigade reformed and marched in column in the place indicated by the order, with occasional exceptions, rendered necessary to secure the left flank of the main column. In this place it was marched, without being again engaged, into Little Rock.
The misfortune of having only a vague idea of the topography of the battle-ground prevented me from using my position in the right rear of the line of the enemy opposed to Glover to greater advantage in giving them a flank fire, and the weakness of my force prevented me from learning earlier in the action that the bayou was impracticable below as well as above the dam, a knowledge that would have freed me from apprehension in regard to the heavy firing on my right rear, and left me free to push the right of the line boldly instead of with the caution with which it was advanced. The negro guide whom I had with me disappeared with the first shell that exploded near me, and was not to be found again during the action. It is to Colonel Glover's line of skirmishers to say that they could not see my line of skirmishers, and that it was their overshooting of the enemy which made the fire fall among my men.
The loss in my brigade was 12 wounded (1 mortally, and since dead), all belonging to the Eighth Missouri. I have understood, unofficially, that the part of the First Iowa on my line lost several men, though I have no authenticated report.
Of the conduct of the Eighth and Merrill's Horse during the whole action, I cannot speak too highly. They moved forward through the corn-field under a heavy cross-fire of grape, canister, and spherical case from the guns in front and right, and at one time a sharp fire from