stration, at Winchester was for the purpose of threatening the rear of Burnside, and not Cumberland or this place. Brigadier-General Cluseret, who now commands the First Brigade of my division, has, at my request, submitted to me his views of movements we have made and should be made in future, and in which I entirely concur, and seems so important that I send you a copy, merely adding that I ought, in addition to the cavalry regiment spoken of by General Cluseret, to have three or four more infantry regiments, so that I can have twelve regiments, at least 10,000 effective men, with me, in addition to what troops will be necessary for the protection of our lines of transportation and the country in our rear. General Cluseret is forty years of age; was general of a French military school, in which he afterward taught for several years; served fourteen years in the French army, ten in Algiers, and through the Crimean war; received the star of the Legion of [Honor] for distinguished services in the French Revolution of 1848, and a badge of honor for distinguished services at Sebastopol; served through the campaign of Fremont and Sigel as colonel, and was made a brigadier-general for his gallantry at Cross Keyes. Being an ardent admirer of our Government, and having come to fight for its existence, and being a gentleman of fine intellect and splendid military knowledge, I think his opinion worthy of consideration.
R. H. MILROY,
NEW CREEK, November 19, 1862.
(Received at Charleston, [W. Va.,] November 20.)
Major General JACOB D. COX:
GENERAL: I do not think there is the least use of our remaining at New Creek. As we told General Kelley, his fears were entirely without foundation. What interest can Jackson possibly have to destroy more of the railroad than he has done, when we reflect on the risk and possible consequences that may arise to him from pushing up into the north-west? The object of destroying a railroad is not so much to capture property as to destroy communication. The latter object Jackson has already attained; further destruction would not advance that object; it would be a piece of folly or deliberate malice, of neither of which Jackson is ever guilty. His position and the disposition of his forces clearly indicate a very different object. Posted on the right flank, and in the rear of the army of Burnside, behind passes by which he can debouch at will to a point between that army and the capital, he is in no standing danger, and can be dislodged from his position only by a battle or by a strategic movement. It is absolutely impossible that he should forego the advantages of such a position to move upon a foolish expedition, which no military man would ever conceive of. What use are we? He, then, absolutely knows that Jackson ought to be dislodged. There are naturally two means of doing this: One by attacking him, which will not probably be done, but which, had I the power, should by all means be done, by a corps detached on the east from Burnside's army and a combination of the troops of Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Cumberland, and New Creek from the west, got together in all speed, and by means of the railroad. The other means is by a strategic movement, which I shall point out. Threaten at once Staunton and the railroad of the south. Jackson will then do one of two things-either he will march through the valley to relieve the threatened point, and rejoin the