War of the Rebellion: Serial 031 Page 0752 OPERATIONS IN N. VA., W.VA., MD., AND PA.

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[CHAP. XXXIII.

JANUARY 20-24, 1863.-The "Mud March."

LIST OF REPORTS.

Numbers 1.-Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.

Numbers 2.-Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.

Numbers 3.-Extracts from "Record of Events" on the several returns for January, 1863.

Numbers 4.-General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia.

Numbers 1. Report of Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Potomac.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

January 21, 1863-11 p.m.

GENERAL: I moved the greater portion of the command, with a view to crossing above, but, owing to the severe storm which began after that the enemy has discovered our design. The roads are almost impassable, and the small streams are very much swollen. I shall try to run any unnecessary risks. It is most likely that we will have to change the plan.

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK.

Numbers 2. Report of Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ARTILLERY,

Camp near Falmouth, Va., January 25, 1863.

COLONEL: I have to report, for the information of the general commanding, that for the operations of the 21st instant, to cover the passage of the army at or near Banks' Ford, the ground was carefully reconnoitered by me, and all the positions which offered advantages for the placing of batteries selected and prepared, with as little exposure as possible of such movements as could give the enemy a clew to our designs.

The points selected were numerous, because the positions from which the enemy could bring guns to bear upon our bridges and upon the troops were not commanded by such extent of ground as would enable us to place sufficient guns to silence those batteries, and at the same time reply to those stationed at other points to bear upon them. It was, consequently, necessary that such positions should be selected, and such a number of guns placed in battery, as would at once shut up the enemy's batteries, as they were unmasked or brought up. An overpowering force of artillery was, therefore, resolved upon. This could be afforded, notwithstanding the smallness of the reserve artillery, by drawing

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*See also Burnside's reports, pp. 68,78-82, 96.

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