who belonged to another corps, but, with the professional zeal of a true soldier, was ready to serve in any part of the field. Captain W. W. Buckley's Rhode Island battery was also brought into action toward evening, and kept up the fire with coolness and judgment, covering the with drawl of Sturgis' division, which was finally relieved at 7.20 p.m. by troops belonging to General Griffin.
General Burns crossed Deep Run, in support of General Franklin's command, at 3 p.m. General Getty's division was held, both as a reserve and as a corps of observation, to watch the communications of the center and guard the left of the town. But at 4 o'clock (the contest still raging) I determined to advance this division, also hoping to draw off some portion of the enemy's troops from our right, and, possibly, to find a weak point in his lines, and effect a lodgment.
It must be borne in mind that all the troops formed under fire. It was impossible to clear the shelter of the town otherwise than by marching each regiment, by a flank, to the open ground, and even this could not be done without confusion. Thus forming in two brigade lines, Getty's division marched gallantly over the broken field, crossed the railroad cutting, then an old canal ditch and some marshy ground, under an artillery fire which increased every moment, until he nearly reached the enemy's works in his front, when a line of musketry opened, and his first brigade was forced back under a severe front and enfilading storm.
The second line (Harland's brigade) likewise advanced, under a fire of shell and shrapnel, to the ridge bordering the railroad, and maintained their ground with their pickets. Here Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, commanding Fourth Rhode Island Volunteers, fell, cheering and leading on his men. The service lost in Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis a skillful and intrepid officer.
In pursuance of orders from General Burnside, Burns' division recrossed Hazel Run next morning, and this corps was then selected to make the main attack. It was formed accordingly. Captain Weed and also selected positions for six batteries to support the movement, and placed several in position, when the order was suspended, and finally countermanded.
On the 15th, the enemy's pickets between Hazel and Deep Runs advanced in line of skirmishers, probably, with a view of gaining the crest of the bank on Hazel Run, from which, by a sudden dash, they might obtain an enfilading fire upon our troops, as well as upon the horses of the two batteries sheltered by the upper bank of the stream near the Bowling Green road. This movement was anticipated by General Getty, and prevented by the troops of Generals Getty and Burns, together with 200 of Berdan's Sharpshooters.
During the night of the 15th, the corps recrossed the Rappahannock, the whole body numbering about 16,000 officers and men,with five batteries, except the pickets, which were withdrawn later-were crossed over noiselessly in less than two hours. The most perfect order prevailed; no confusion in the ranks; no sings of alarm or demoralization, notwithstanding many hours of passive exposure to the enemy's sharpshooters and artillery. The ease with which this remarkable withdrawal was effected was due partly to the arrangements made by Major Crosby (Twenty-first Connecticut Volunteers), provost-marshal, who, with a pioneer party at the bridge, and a cavalry patrol from the bridge toward the camp, paved the way smoothly and rapidly for the movements, and partly to the superior organization of the different depart-