In front of the crest occupied by these batteries was a second crest, separated from the first by a wide ditch. About 3.30 p.m. it was determined by General Couch to risk a battery in this position. Captain Morgan, his chief of artillery, carefully examined the ground, and directed Captain Hazard to place his battery (six 12-pounders) at the point indicated. The order was executed with coolness and gallantry, the battery being brought within 150 yards of the enemy's position. In about fifteen minutes, 16 men and 15 horses, including those of the captain and his two lieutenants (Bloodgood and Milne) were placed hors de combat. Hazard's battery was supported by four guns of Frank's battery (12-pounders) which were taken into action in fine style a little to the left and rear of Hazard's. Both batteries were handsomely served, and the retreat of a regiment, the men of which rushed pell-mell through them, produced no bad effect on the cannoneers.
These batteries were withdrawn when the assault of Humphreys' division failed. Hazard's battery had been so much disabled that one gun had to be brought off by hand, and its limber, left temporarily on the field, was then brought off the Sergt. Anthony B. Horton (First Rhode Island Artillery), who volunteered for the purpose. When these batteries were moved to the advanced ridge they were replaced on the first by Phillips' battery (six 3-inch guns), the fire of which was very effective.
When Lieutenant Dickenson was killed, the command of the battery devolved upon Lieutenant Egan, First U. S. Artillery, the only other officer with it, who was compelled to withdraw it from the superior fire of the enemy. First Sergeant Moran (Fourth U. S. Artillery), badly of the enemy. First Sergeant Moran (Fourth U. S. Artillery), badly wounded in the face of the first fire, continued at his post, and, when his commanding officer was killed, took command of a section.
Franklin's attack on the left was made by his grand division, Smith's and Reynolds' corps, re-enforced by Birney's and Sickleys' divisions, of Stoneman's corps, and the deployment of the attack enabled him to bring all his division artillery into action.
The right of the troops connected with Getty's division between Deep and Hazel Runs. On the right of Deep Run was placed Williston's battery (six 12-pounders.) On the left, Ayres' (under command of Lieutenant Martin), Butler's, McCartney's, Clark's, and Snow's batteries, in the order named, were in line parallel to and in front of the Bowling Green road, forming a large battery was posted Hexamer's (six 10-pounders).
This development of artillery was rendered necessary, first, to keep clear the spur on our right, from which our advancing line could be enfiladed; second, to prevent the enemy striking at our bridges and cutting our communication with them, and, third, to clear the hill in front of our line of battle, should the enemy attempt to prevent our deployment. This line of artillery was prolonged to the left by Hall's Ransom's and Cooper's batteries, the last of which extended to the road which runs perpendicular to our front, and strikes the river at Smith-field. Our troops occupied this road, thus forming a crotchet at Cooper's position. On the prolongation of the Bowling Green road, at its intersection with another cross-road, the enemy had placed a battery, which could enfilade our left batteries.
About 9 a.m. the enemy's whole line opened on our front and left, and Simpson's battery (four 12-pounders) changed front to fire to the left, on the guns already mentioned as being on the Bowling Green road and enfilading our line. He was assisted in this duty by Wolcott's battery (six 3-inch guns), stationed at Smithfield, where our extreme left struck