the Texas Rangers, I am indebted for the capture and safe delivery of many of the mules taken. Major Bledsoe, of Murray's regiment, was prompt and efficient in burning the wagons which could not be removed. Lieut. G. W. McNeal, of my staff, and Private Copeland, of Third Confederate Regiment, burned several wagons under very heavy fire from the enemy. The wagons were riddled with bullets during the firing.
Night coming on, I started for Murfreesborough, which place I reached at 1 a.m. next morning, after a march of 40 miles and four hours' fighting. My loss in Murray's, Smith's, and Cox's regiment and Malone's battalion in officers and men was very considerable. The command encamped the remainder of the night on the left of our line of battle.
Upon Friday I was ordered by General Bragg to the right. When Breckinridge's division attacked the enemy's left on Friday afternoon, having received no intimation that such an attack was contemplated, I accompanied Pegram's battery to the front and right with Companies D and K, of the Texas Rangers, and my escort company. Capt. Paul [F.] Anderson not being able to induce General Pegram to open with his battery (he being fearful of firing into our own troops), I took charge of the battery, placing it upon a commanding hill, and opened fire upon a heavy column of the enemy advancing from their extreme left to turn Breckinridge's right. The fire was so effective (the range not being over 500 yards) as to shoot down their standard and throw them into confusion. The fire was continued until my horse was shot. I was thrown in his struggles, and when I succeeded in getting another horse the battery had been run off without any occasion whatever. Shortly after his, Breckinridge's division gave way. I sent an order back for my command to dismounted and to advance to cover our retreating forces. I rode across the field and joined General Preston, whom I found at the head of the remnants of his brigade, going to where my men were formed on foot. The command remained in saddle all night in rear and as the support of a battery on our extreme right.
During Saturday nothing of importance occurred, the command being held upon the extreme right to prevent the enemy from turning that flank.
In obedience to orders from Lieutenant-General Polk, I moved the command before daylight Sunday morning into Murfreesborough. I left three regiments to burn a bridge, and fell back slowly before the enemy, and sent the remainder 6 miles on the Shelbyville pike to feed, sine which time I have been at this point picketing and protecting the front of our army.
It is considered proper to state that on Monday, the 29th, we were engaged the entire day between the Franklin dirt road and the Wilkinson pike with a large force of the enemy's cavalry, and that the Texas Rangers acted with even more than their usual gallantry in a dashing charge, saving on regiment of the brigade from a complete rout by the enemy's forces.
I take pleasure in reporting the conduct of the entire command in the different engagements as characterized by intrepidity and a determination to conquer at all hazards. The Rangers, being armed with regiments in the brigade. The battle of Wednesday was fought at great disadvantage on our part, the enemy's cavalry being much more efficiently armed and equipped. The proper weapon for cavalry has proven to be the revolver.
It affords me great pleasure to commend in the highest terms both officers and soldiers. Colonels Cox, Harrison, and Smith, Lieutenant-Colonels