honor to command that I should mention the results of their laborious exertions and chivalrous gallantry, constantly exhibited under many adverse circumstances. From the time the army left Washington to the end of the campaign at Warrenton, the cavalry of my command had taken from the enemy 6 pieces of artillery, 4 stand of colors, and 1,000 prisoners of war, without losing a single gun or color. These facts show that the officers and men of our cavalry have the energy, the intelligence, the courage, and enterprise to make them superior to any cavalry they have to contend with, and yet no one is more painfully conscious than myself that the opinion is entertained that our cavalry has been deficient in its duty in the present rebellion. I will, therefore, mention a few facts to show that, wherever there exists a foundation for such an opinion, the fault does not rest with the cavalry. The rebels have always had more cavalry in the field than we, and whenever we have fought them their numbers were two to three to one of ours. Such a difference is always an encouragement to brave soldiers, for they never stop to inquire their number; but such a difference tells fearfully upon the hard service the horses have to perform. Good horses are broken down by it; inferior ones are literally thrown away in such service. The rebel cavalry are mounted on the best horses in the South, while our cavalry are furnished a very inferior animal, bought by contract, and which is totally unfit for efficient service. The best horses in my command are the horses my men have captured from the rebel cavalry, in their different engagements with them. As instance, on of my companies has 22 rebel horses out of 53, and these horses are the best in the company. Out of 18 horses furnished this same company by the quartermaster's department at Knoxville, only 2 are left in the company, and these are very inferior. Does not this show that the officers and men who thus wrest the elements of success from the hands of the enemy are superior to the circumstances surrounding them, and are not responsible for those failures which are used as illustrations against them?
I respectfully submit to the favorable consideration of the major-general commanding and the Government the following-named officers for distinguished gallantry and good conduct throughout the campaign: Colonel J. F. Farnsworth, Eighth Illinois Cavalry; Colonel D. McM. Gregg, Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry; Colonel B. F. Davis, Eighth New York Cavalry; Major Chapman, Third Indiana Cavalry, and Captain W. P. Sanders, Sixth U. S. Cavalry. These officers each commanded regiments. Of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, Majors Beveridge and Medill, and Captains Hynes and Forsyth; of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Peter Keenan; of the Eighth New York Cavalry, Major Markell, Captains Pope, Barry, and Moore; of the Third Indiana Cavalry, Captain Lemmon; of the Sixth U. S. Cavalry, First Lieutenant James F. Wade and First Lieutenant Spangler, Second Lieuts. Albert Coats and Joseph Kerin; of Pennington's battery, First Lieuts. A. C. M. Pennington, jr., Robert H. Chapin, and Frank B. Hamilton.
Of Brigadier-General Averell's brigade, no reports have been received, as it was soon after detached on other service. As a brigade, its services were always efficient and well rendered. One exception came under my notice at Amissville, viz, the gallantry and efficiency of Captain Harrison, commanding Fifth Cavalry, against a superior force of the enemy.
Of Tidball's battery, Captain Tidball, Second Artillery; Lieuts. William N. Dennison and Robert Clarke.
My staff officers throughout the campaign served with zeal, energy,