Question. What was the condition of your supply of ammunition at the time of the surrender?
Answer. The conditions was a sad one. It was a fact that we had no ammunition of sufficient range to make a successful fire on the enemy.
Question. The long-range ammunition was exhausted?
Answer. Yes, sir; it was so reported to me by captains of the batteries.
Question. Do you know of any efforts having been made to obtain a further supply?
Answer. The ordnance officer, Mr. Thompson, I think, mentioned to me, when I was examining his arsenal and stores - he said that requisitions had been made, but he had heard nothing from them. Requisitions had also been made for heavy ordnance.
Question. Did he state when those requisitions had been made?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you remember whether the cannonade in the direction of General McClellan's command was heard at Harper's Ferry before the surrender, on Sunday and on Monday morning?
Answer. I heard cannonading in a northeasterly direction, or in the direction of Frederick, I think on Sunday.
Question. What distance off did it seem to be?
Answer. I hardly noticed at the time even the direction of the wind, which governs those things a great deal. It could not have been less than 10 miles distant.
Question. What is your judgment as to the practicability of the troops escaping over the river the night previous to the surrender?
Answer. I considered that impossible.
Question. Will you state why you so considered it?
Answer. I am simply giving my opinion. I do not pretend to know a great deal about these matters. We had but one way of crossing the river, and that was over the pontoon bridge, and in driving a great deal over such a bridge it would rack it a great deal. The crossing must necessarily be very slow, and the blocking up of such a bridge by even one loaded wagon, of r instance, would delay us a great while. It could not have been done short of a night, at the lowest calculation, and then, after crossing, the whole command would have been likely to have been destroyed. The position of the road along that mountain is such that they could have been destroyed. The position of the road along that mountain is such that they could have been flanked by a small force of the enemy and destroyed entirely. There is but one way to go, I suppose, and that is the route the cavalry took, which, I think, is very impracticable for infantry or a train of any kind. Along the bank of the canal, in case of an attack, such a confusion would have resulted that it would have been a disaster and a surrender, only on one side of the river instead of the other.
By General WHITE:
Question. Do you know of Colonel Miles repeatedly rejecting the proposition to take the command out, refusing to entertain such a proposition, on the ground that he was ordered to remain at Harper's Ferry, and hold it to the last extreme?
Answer. Yes, sir; he showed me his orders, and expressed his intention to hold it.
Question. Do you recollect the proposition by myself, on Sunday, after the engagement on the left, to mass the artillery in front, taking up all that could be spared, all except what was necessary for the defense of the bridges? If you do remember it, will you state any reason why it was said it was not proper to do it?
Answer. I distinctly remember the conversation in my rood between yourself and myself, and one great reason for not doing so was the want of proper means of moving the artillery to the front, and, and, after getting it there, the want of material to move it back again in case of necessity.