sheep, and it took two hours to get them together again in the ravines, where they were perfectly under cover.
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. Did you succeed finally in tranquilizing them?
Answer. I succeeded in getting them together in the ravines under cover. But a few moments afterward, during the engagement, when I asked Colonel Willard to send his regiment to support Colonel Downey, he said it was no use to march that regiment to meet the enemy; they were so panic-struck he could not hold them together to face the enemy, and I was compelled to send Colonel Downey. There were portions of other regiments, I have ascertained since, that had already become panic-struck and left. I saw that when General White asked me to go back and bring the men together; after the surrender.
Question. What is your judgment as to the possibility of that force escaping across the river the night before the surrender?
Answer. We had no knowledge at all of the position of the enemy. It would have been venturing upon blind chance. But if Colonel Miles had consented to it or listened to the proposition, and held a military consultation, I believe that nine-tenths of the officers would have voted for venturing the attempt to cut our way out; that was the feeling. I know it was my own feeling. I asked Colonel Miles 2.30 on Sunday whether we had not better attempt to fight our way our in some direction. He said, "No; he could not listen to any such proposition; he was ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards."
Question. Did you not regard that a means of holding of holding Harper's Ferry, to occupy the heights?
Answer. Yes, sir. If we had still held Maryland Heights, or had marched over there Sunday night. I would have been willing to have gone over there by moonlight on Sunday night and attempted to retake Maryland Heights.
Question. Were they then occupied by the enemy?
Answer. I was so much engaged in my position that I had no opportunity of knowing of anything outside of it. I cannot answer positively in regard to that matter.
Question. The whole objection of Colonel Miles was upon the ground that he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards?
Answer. Yes, sir; that was the point he made, and had made more than once.
Question. Was there any remonstrance on the part of the officer to the effect that they would succeed in holding Harper's Ferry by occupying the heights?
Answer. I do not know what other officers may have said to him. I was kept so much engaged on the left that I did not get ho Harper's Ferry, or to any other part of the command, and I had very little opportunity to know what other officers said to Colonel Miles. I know what I said to him myself.
Question. Did you yourself urge that?
Answer. I thought we had better try to save the command, even if we lost our transportation. To save our small-arms and troops to the Government would have been a great deal better than to run any risk of losing them. And if he would have consented, I have no doubt the majority of the officers would have much preferred attempting to cut our way out in some direction. The reply was that he could not consent to anything of the kind; he had been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry at all hazards. At that moment the shells commenced coming rather rapidly from Loudoun Heights, and interfered with our conversation, and he rode off, and there was nothing more said upon the subject.
Question. A council of was was not called until the next morning?
Answer. He never held any consultation, that I am aware of, with his brigade commanders from the time they were appointed until the Monday morning, about the surrender. I know that as a body they were not called together for consultation at any time.