subject to the attention of the commander of the corps, mentioning my intention to take official action upon it. From this, however, I was dissuaded as unnecessary, since every one of my acts had received the full approval of the commander of the corps of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, nor did the time appear to me to be suitable for such matters, expecting, as I did, that active operations would be continued. Subsequently, during the month of October, I was intrusted with an important and difficult reconnaissance to Leetown, in face of nearly the whole army of the enemy. The duty executed with entire success, and received the cordial approbation of the corps and army commanders. With such marks of confidence, and absorbed in the duties of the campaign, the note of Major-General Halleck had almost entirely passed out of my remembrance. It is now recalled with a meaning attached to it that, in my opinion, renders it incumbent upon me to ask the subject be investigated. I know what my standing is in the estimation of those with whom I have been associated, and I cannot silently permit that reputation to be dimmed in the faintest degree by the expression of opinion of any one, whatever his official rank may be.
As the statement accompanying this communication is lengthy, I beg leave to add, as a synopsis of it: That, on Friday, the 12th September, about noon, I was ordered, without any previous intimation, to take command of a division of new troops, about 7,000 strong, which would pass through the city that day about 3 o'clock p.m., and march on the road to Rockville; to see that it was well supplied with rations, forage, and ammunition; that all baggage that could be dispensed with should be stored and that the command should be kept fresh on the march; that I was not informed of the position of our army or that of the enemy, or of the probability that a battle would soon take place; that I had no staff officers, and could get none at the Departments; that the troops did not begin to reach the city until 7 o'clock p.m., and did not reach their bivouac near Columbia College until from midnight to morning; that one brigade (3,600 strong) had no rations whatever and an insufficient supply of forage; that all its arms were unserviceable; that it had no wagons for ammunition and no supply train, and that its regimental wagons, five per regiment, did not arrive until near midday Saturday; that it had no ambulances, or but one per regiment; that it had not shelter-tents, but full regulation allowance of common tents, which it could not transport, and that it officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage; that the other brigade (3,600 strong) had an insufficient supply of rations and forage, and but eight wagons for supply train, and one ambulance per regiment; that the arms of one of the regiments were unserviceable; that the brigade had no shelter-tents, but the allowance of common tents; that officers and men had a heavy supply of personal baggage; that I made every effort possible to supply the deficiencies and march on Saturday, but found it impracticable, but that on Saturday night all deficiencies were supplied through my personal efforts, and that my command marched at daylight, Sunday, 14th September; that by orders received at Monocacy Station Tuesday evening, my command halted near Frederick during Wednesday to protect that city, marching again under new orders received at 3.30 o'clock p.m. of that day, and by additional orders continued that march during the night and was in position at Antietam at an early hour the next morning, Thursday, 18th September,having marched more than 23 miles.
24 R R-VOL XIX, PT I