their guns, and serious injury was inflicted upon the infantry, which in several instances broke and fled from our shot.
By the same authority a portion of Sykes' division was advanced to support the horse batteries and cavalry immediately in front of Sharpsburg, under Brigadier-General Pleasonton. I was also instructed to replace Pleasonton's batteries till their ammunition could be replenished. Having sent off to other corps all batteries of reserve artillery, they were relieved by Sykes' guns, the only ones available. Their range was too short and they were soon returned. On his call for more support, four more battalions were sent over in the afternoon. They were sent as support to the batteries and to keep to enemy's skirmishers from disturbing our cannoneers. They were, however, diverted from that service, and employed to drive the enema's skirmishers to their reserves. Their many losses attest the serious work they had to perform.
Still later in the afternoon I received from General Pleasonton aa call for a division to press the success obtained by this small band of regulars, accompanied by the statement that Burnside and Sumner were driving the enemy. Between the dispatching and receiving of that call the tide of battle had changed. Our troops on the left under Burnside had been driven from the heights which they had so gallantly crowned, while those on the immediate right, under Sumner, were held in check. The army was at a stand. I had not the force asked for, and could not, under my orders, risk the safety of the artillery and center of the line, and perhaps imperil the success of the day by further diminishing my small command, not then 4,000 strong-then in the front line and unsupported, and protecting aall our trains. Before dark General Sykes had ordered Lieutenant Miller to report with his battery to General Burnside. Colonel Warren, with his brigade, had been sent earlier in the day.
Humphreys' division arrived on the 18th and relieved Morell, who was ordered to the left in support of Burnside. Sykes' and Humphreys' were held ready for any emergency, but were not called to active operations. The heavy batteries had expended their ammunition, and did not receive a supply until the 19th. Morell's division, on reporting to General Burnside, relieved his corps, which was at once recalled from its position in front of Antietam Bridge.
At an early hour on the 19th it was discovered that the enemy had nearly evacuated Sharpsburg, and the Fifth with other corps was directed to take up a position in line beyond the town, but afterward order to pursue the enemy and give aid to the cavalry brigade, then in advance. I found that the enemy, pressed by Pleasonton, had crossed the river, and was holding the right bank, defending the fords with artillery well posted. I determined to clear the fords, and, if possible, secure some of the enemy's artillery. With this view I caused the banks of the river and canal to be well lined with skirmishers and sharpshooters, supported by portions of their respective divisions (Morell's and Sykes'), while their artillery and that of the reserve was posted to control the opposite bank.
While these were driving from their guns the cannoneers and horses, and silencing the fire of the infantry, an attacking party from Griffin's and Barnes' brigades, composed of the Fourth Michigan and parts of the On hundred and eighteenth Pennsylvania and the Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts Regiments, volunteers for the occasion, was formed under the immediate direction of General Griffin, and moved across the river in face of a warm fire from the enemy's infantry. Through some misunderstanding, an order for Sykes to move over a similar party