War of the Rebellion: Serial 025 Page 0194 WEST TENN. AND NORTHERN MISS. Chapter XXIX.

Search Civil War Official Records

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, August 31, 1862.

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Miss.:

Could you send any more troops into Tennessee or Kentucky, east of the Cumberland, without risking your own positions; if so, from what points can you best spare them?

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS,

September 1, 1862-5.30 p.m.

General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

I am weak and threatened with present forces from Humboldt to Bolivar, and at this point would deem it very unsafe to spare any more troops, except by abandoning railroad east of Bear Creek. In that case could send one division from Tuscumbia or any point from there to Decatur. Would send Stanley's division.

U. S. GRANT.

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS,

Trenton, Tenn., September 1, 1862.

Major General U. S. GRANT, Corinth, Miss.:

The rebel force that crossed the Hatchie at Brownsville camped at Poplar Corners, on Forked Deer River, last night. This is about 12 miles from Humboldt southwest. I have no surplus force, only enough to guard the road and hardly that effectively. At all important bridges I have good block-houses and believe my force guarding them can hold their positions against any cavalry.

G. M. DODGE,

Brigadier-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, September 2, 1862.

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Miss.:

Railroad east of Corinth may be abandoned and Granger's division sent to Louisville, Ky., with all possible dispatch.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

HDQRS. CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Trenton, Tenn., September 2, 1862.

Captain M. ROCHESTER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus, Ky.:

CAPTAIN: The crossing of the rebel forces at Brownsville and the attack on Bolivar and Medon has kept us busy. The forces that attacked Medon crossed at Cloverfoot and were re-enforced by a portion of the force that crossed at Brownsville. They worked up the Hatchie by keeping in the bottoms. All this time I was aware of their movements, but crossing the Hatchie so far down and in such force convinced me that they meant mischief on my lines, and they still hang along the line from 10 to 12 miles off, ready to make a dash. If I could have had a regiment of infantry and a small force of cavalry I could have stopped