tion was fired into by enemy and considerably injured. During the day a train arrived from Columbus and remained overnight, having on board some 60 or 70 soldiers returning from hospitals. These I also armed.
On Saturday morning the train was ordered to Jackson, leaving about 20 of these men, representing fifteen different regiments.
On Friday evening (the 19th) Colonel Hawkins returned from the Lexington fight and reported that he did not see more than 800 of the enemy, and that he saw no artillery except the two pieces taken from our forces. This news gave us renewed hopes. Our stockade was secure against any force of cavalry of infantry unless accompanied by artillery.
Forrest's demonstration toward Jackson with a portion of his force was merely a feint, his main object being Trenton and Humboldt and the Mobile and Ohio railroad, with a view to cut off General Grant's supplies.
Learning from my scouts on Friday morning (the 19th) that the main force of the enemy was moving toward Trenton I telegraphed to General Davies, at Columbus, to send me re-enforcements, with one battery of artillery, if possible, as I expected an attack hourly. To this dispatch I received no answer. On the arrival of the train at noon I learned from Ex-Governor Wood, of Illinois, that when he left Columbus that morning a regiment of infantry was disembarking. I again telegraphed to General Davies for re-enforcements, with a battery of artillery, stating that my force had been ordered to Jackson and that I had nothing left but convalescents. To this replied that he had no men or artillery to spare.
On Saturday morning I learned from scouts that Forrest had encamped at Spring Creek with his entire force. I telegraphed this fact to General Sullivan. General Haynie, then in command at Jackson, answered that General Sullivan was in the field and asked the distance and direction to Spring Creek. I answered 20 miles, and that the enemy would approach from the east. The wires were cut soon after, and I had no further communication with Jackson.
Under these circumstances I was determined to make the best possible defense, and collected the convalescents, stragglers, fugitives, and other soldiers until I got together a force of about 250 men. This was the condition of things up to noon on Saturday, and I felt confident of holding the place against every force except artillery. Twenty-five sharpshooters, under command of Lieutenant Allender, of the Second West Tennessee Cavalry, were placed on a brick building across the street, the top of which was well protected by a parapet wall about 3 feet high. A squad of 6 men were placed in a building that commanded another street, to fire from the windows. All officers in the breastworks were placed in positions where they could be most serviceable. Scouts, who were watching the movements and approach of the enemy reported them within a few miles and that they would be upon us soon.
At about 3 o'clock they made their appearance and charged our position in two columns. When within 100 yards of the sharpshooters a deadly fire was opened on them from the advance posts, the men in the stockade following the example. In a very short time both columns were repulsed with considerable loss in killed and wounded. They then moved rapidly out of range of our guns to the right and left, completely surrounding our position, we supposed for a charge on all sides at once, a maneuver for which we were fully prepared. Instead of this they planted a battery of six guns on an elevated position southeast of
36 R R-VOL XVII